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  introDuction
There is some evidence that minors occasionally request genetic testing.1 Some 
seek it on their own behalf, while others do so in conjunction with their parents or 
guardians. However, there is considerable disagreement as to whether minors should 
be tested at all, regardless of their competence.




This part of the report is concerned with genetic testing of competent minors at 
their request. It covers predictive testing, which includes pre-symptomatic and 
susceptibility testing, and carrier testing. 
Arguments opposing genetic testing in competent minors are generally premised on 
one or both of the following arguments: the consequences of genetic testing may be 
too harmful to permit minors to give legally effective consent to testing (even if they 
are competent to consent to other medical procedures); and genetic information 
and the implications of genetic testing are such that minors cannot competently 
comprehend them and give effective consent to testing. We have already considered 
whether there is merit in the view that minors should not be granted access to genetic 
testing, regardless of competence, by examining the harms and benefits of genetic 
testing. The limited evidence available regarding harms does not support the view 
that the consequences of testing would be too harmful. Such evidence as exists 
suggests not only that there are benefits in testing competent minors, but also that 
there may be harm in not testing competent minors who for good reason request a 
genetic test. 
We now explore the current law in New Zealand to determine whether it would 
permit competent minors to consent to genetic testing and whether genetic testing 
should require special consent conditions. There is no explicit regulation or policy 
relating to genetic testing of minors in New Zealand. Competent minors can consent 
and refuse consent to medical treatment and procedures pursuant to section 36(1) 
of the Care of Children Act (COCA) 2004, Gillick as applied in New Zealand	and the 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 1996. Such evidence as 
exists with regard to genetic testing of minors does not support the view that genetic 
testing requires a different regulatory or policy response from that currently in place 
for competent minors making general medical decisions.
Exploring the issues with regard to competent minors in our existing medical 
decision-making context not only serves to highlight a few anomalies and concerns 
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within the current system (particularly in relation to how competence is assessed 
and section 36(1) of the COCA 2004 is to be interpreted), but also helps to clarify the 
debate around whether a higher standard of competence is required with respect to 
consent to genetic testing. 
In our view, consent to genetic testing does not require a higher level of competence 
than consent to medical treatment or procedures relating to other serious conditions. 
The genetic testing procedure, in terms of medical intervention, is simple (usually 
a blood test). The genetic information and consequences of a positive or negative 
result may be more complex; but this is an issue and a challenge for practitioners in 
terms of information giving, rather than an issue that affects a minor’s competence 
or legal capacity. Because genetic test results can have significant implications for a 
minor’s future, the capacity to understand the short and long-term risks and benefits 
of testing must be carefully considered. However that is also the case for many other 
treatments and procedures, such as cancer treatment or organ transplants. 
We contend that our existing medico-legal framework already recognises the ability 
of competent minors to give legally effective consent to genetic testing. We argue that 
this is the appropriate response because it respects the autonomy of the competent 
minor and there is limited evidence of actual significant harm caused by genetic 
testing of competent minors at their own request. Given that the request is only likely 
to be made when the minor is at risk, harm may in fact ensue from not testing the 
minor.
We argue that the legal framework for medical decision-making in New Zealand 
is largely appropriate in its application to genetic testing of competent minors. 
However, we recommend that, in light of the prevalent discourse focusing on the 
harms of genetic testing, we implement our own set of guidelines or protocols on 
genetic testing of minors to clarify and raise awareness of the issues for New Zealand 
practitioners, parents and society as a whole. 
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2  general legal context regarDing comPetent minors anD   
 genetic testing
Because of the difficulty in determining a psychosocial benefit, the discourse about 
genetic testing of minors ultimately tends to focus on who has the right to make the 
decision and whose right to autonomy is jeopardized.3
2.  introduction
There is a passionate debate about whether a minor should be allowed to consent to 
genetic testing. One argument against genetic testing is that the potential consequences 
are too harmful for minors. We argued in the second section of this report that there 
is little evidence to support that view and that harms may potentially arise from not 
testing a competent minor who has requested a genetic test. We concluded that, on 
the balance of the existing evidence, the potential benefits of testing, particularly 
when benefits are viewed holistically, appear to outweigh the potential harms when 
testing is undertaken at the request of a competent minor. In any event, the evidence 
of harm is not sufficiently strong to persuade us that minors should be denied access 
to genetic testing.
A second argument against genetic testing of minors is that they lack the competence 
to consent. 
This section focuses on the existing general legal framework relevant to competent 
minors and decision-making in clinical genetics, and how minors might become 
aware that they are at risk for a heritable genetic disorder.
2.2  scenarios in which a minor’s ability to consent to or refuse to consent to   
 genetic testing will become relevant
In order to give the following discussion a practical context, it is important to envisage 
the scenarios in which a minor’s ability to consent to or refuse to consent to genetic 
testing will become relevant – before embarking on a discussion of the regulatory 
framework within which such decisions must be made. 
• A minor might seek genetic testing with the support of parents or legal 
guardians. 
• A minor might seek genetic testing alone, or with a friend or an adult who is 
not legally entitled to give proxy consent to medical procedures on the minor’s 
behalf. The minor’s parents or guardians might be unaware of, or disinterested 
in, the fact that their child is seeking genetic testing. 
• A minor might seek genetic testing against the wishes of parents or guardians.
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• A minor might be refusing genetic testing that the parents or guardians want 
her to undergo.4 
The legal and professional frameworks, within which genetic testing decisions must 
be made, will now be discussed. 
2.  genetic testing of competent minors aged sixteen or seventeen
2.3.1  The COCA 2004
Section 36 of the COCA 2004 governs consent by minors to medical procedures 
generally. It provides:
 36 Consent to procedures generally
 (1) A consent, or refusal to consent, to any of the following, if given by a child of  
 or over the age of 16 years, has effect as if the child were of full age: 
  (a) any donation of blood by the child:
  (b) any medical, surgical, or dental treatment or procedure (including a   
  blood transfusion …) to be carried out on the child for the child’s   
  benefit by a person professionally qualified to carry it out.
Pursuant to section 36(1) of the COCA 2004, children5 of or over the age of sixteen 
(or children who are or have been married or in a civil union or de facto relationship, 
section 36(2)) can consent or refuse to consent, as if they were of full age, to any 
medical, surgical or dental treatment or procedure (including a blood transfusion), 
to be carried out for his or her benefit by a person professionally qualified to carry 
it out.
2.3.2  Genetic testing: Treatment or procedure?
The right given to sixteen and seventeen-year-olds6 to make their own medical 
decisions was significantly broadened by the COCA 2004: the ability to refuse to 
consent, as opposed to merely consent, was not present in the previous provision 
(section 25(1) of the Guardianship Act 1968); and ‘treatments’ as well as ‘procedures’ 
have been included in the provision, indicating that young adults have rights in 
respect of a wider range of interventions.7
Even if a predictive genetic test for a condition for which there were no beneficial 
medical interventions available were not considered to be ‘medical treatment,’ it 
would fall within the ambit of the category ‘medical procedure’. ‘Procedure’ must be 
interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, there being no specific definition in 
the COCA 2004. According to the Oxford	English	Dictionary procedure means ‘The 
fact or manner of proceeding with any action, or in any circumstance or situation; … 
a series of steps followed in a regular definite order’.8 Therefore, prima	facie	pursuant 
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to section 36(1) of the COCA 2004, minors of or over the age of sixteen have the legal 
right to consent or refuse consent to a genetic test. 
However, note the proviso in section 36(1): a sixteen or seventeen-year-old’s consent 
(or refusal to consent) to a medical procedure has effect as if she were of full age if the 
procedure is to be carried out for her benefit. This proviso creates some anomalies. 
2.3.3  Interpretation of ‘To be carried out on the child for the child’s benefit’
The wording of section 36(1) is clear in empowering sixteen and seventeen-year-
olds to consent or refuse consent to treatment and procedures for their benefit. 
Its predecessor, section 25 of the Guardianship Act 1969, was much narrower in 
scope in that it only permitted sixteen and seventeen-year-olds only to consent to 
treatment for their benefit. It was not clear if they could refuse treatment, whether 
or not it was for their benefit. The United Kingdom case law has relied on a lack of 
statutory recognition of a right to refuse consent to override a minor’s refusal.9 But 
commentators here were of the view that such an interpretation was illogical and 
undesirable. If sixteen-year-olds were presumed to have the same competence as an 
adult to consent, they should also have the competence to refuse. Those views were 
implemented in the COCA 2004. Section 36(1) permits sixteen and seventeen-year-
olds to refuse treatment even if the proposed treatment is to the benefit of the minor. 
The amendment significantly enhances the rights of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds 
to make health-care decisions.
However, by retaining the proviso relating to ‘benefit’, section 36 creates an anomaly 
on a literal reading. The minor would have the right to refuse treatment that is to 
the minor’s benefit, but not the right to refuse treatment that is not to the minor’s 
benefit. This interpretation defeats common sense. Section 5(1) of the Interpretation 
Act 1999 states that the meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from its text 
and	in	the	light	of	its	purpose. A purposive interpretation of the section suggests that 
Parliament intended sixteen and seventeen-year-olds to have the same competence 
as adults in the context of medical decision-making. On that view, the minor would 
have the right to consent to or refuse treatment, whether it is to the minor’s benefit 
or not. In our view, this is the better interpretation. If our interpretation is incorrect, 
section 36 leaves a gap in the law governing minors. In that case the common law 
rules will govern competence to consent.10 
The ‘benefit proviso’ in section 36(1) has not been subject to subsequent judicial 
interpretation. Academic commentary suggests that the proviso is aimed at restricting 
minors from consenting to non-therapeutic procedures, such as organ donation.11 
Commentary on section 61 of the Crimes Act 1961 (which protects people from 
criminal responsibility ‘for performing with reasonable care and skill any surgical 
operation upon any person for his benefit, if the performance of the operation was 






Additionally, the inclusion (and lack of definition) of the word ‘procedure’ in section 
36(1) (as opposed to merely treatment) ‘could be interpreted to allow a child to consent 
to medical procedures that need not be directly for the benefit of that child’.13 
The purposive approach to statutory interpretation of section 36(1) endorses the 
reading that sixteen or seventeen-year-old minors can legally consent to treatment 
or a procedure that they believe is for their own benefit. The provision is aimed at 
recognising and respecting the competency and autonomy of sixteen and seventeen-
year-olds as if they were of full age. 
2.3.4  Meaning of benefit
The word ‘benefit’ is not defined in the COCA 2004, nor was it discussed during the 
parliamentary debates on the Care of Children Bill. 
If our interpretation is incorrect and minors are indeed only permitted to consent 
or refuse consent to treatments and procedures that are of benefit to them, then we 
would argue that ‘benefit’ should be interpreted widely to include not only physical 
benefits, but also psychological and emotional benefits, as explained in the second 
section of this report. It would thus be possible for sixteen and seventeen-year-
old minors to consent to pre-symptomatic genetic testing as well as susceptibility 
testing and carrier testing. As outlined earlier, all of these tests can be beneficial to 
the minor. 
Note that section 36(1) does not restrict a sixteen or seventeen-year-old minor 
to consenting only to procedures that are in the minor’s ‘best interests’. Such a 
qualification on consent would require an overall balancing and assessment of all of 
the purported benefits and harms and the likelihood of any or all of them resulting 
from testing. Whilst the phrase ‘best interests’ is used in other parts of the Act,14 it is 
not employed in this section. The term ‘benefit’ is used, as it is in section 61 of the 
Crimes Act 1961, in relation to which it has been said:
The	 ‘for	 his	 benefit’	 requirement	 is	 not	 expressed	 in	 terms	 of	 physical	 benefit	
alone.	It	should	not	be	interpreted	in	a	restrictive	way	…15	
The benefit standard is different from the ‘best interests’ standard, and presumably 
was used purposefully. Again, taking the purposive approach to interpretation of 
section 36(1), where there are benefits to genetic testing in a particular case, then a 
sixteen or seventeen-year-old minor’s consent to such testing is as effective as if he 
or she were of full age. It matters not what those benefits are, or even if some harms 
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are also attendant – so long as there are benefits. Furthermore, there is no stipulation 
that the benefit to the minor must be medical. 
The term benefit should be interpreted holistically, as the phrase best interests 
has been interpreted,16 to include psychological, social and other benefits. The 
non-medical benefits and harms of the various kinds of genetic tests have been 
discussed.17 The evidence for both outcomes is tentative at best, but there appears 
to be more evidence of benefits arising from genetic testing, particularly on request, 
than evidence of harms. 
If a minor is seeking a genetic test voluntarily and without pressure from others, this 
prima	facie	indicates that the minor considers that testing will be beneficial. The sixteen 
or seventeen-year-old minor who consents to a genetic test in these circumstances is 
exercising autonomy and making personal decisions about life (which is the purpose 
of the provision). The minor is presumed competent by statute, which should be the 
end of the inquiry.18 Regardless, we have argued earlier, in the section on ‘Benefits 
and harms’, that allowing a competent person to exercise autonomy and liberty, and 
make individual choices, is beneficial. 






2.3.5  Conclusion for genetic testing of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds
In our view, sixteen and seventeen-year-olds have the statutory right to consent or 
refuse consent to genetic testing by virtue of section 36(1) of the COCA 2004. Even 
if their rights are confined to treatments or procedures that are to their benefit, we 
conclude that they would still be entitled to seek and consent to genetic testing, 
because the most recent and extensive evidence (discussed earlier) points towards 
clear benefits arising from genetic testing of minors on the basis of their own 
informed consent. 
There is clear evidence of clinical benefits attendant upon predictive testing for some 
disorders for which medical interventions are available e.g. the FAP mutation. There 
are also benefits to symptomatic genetic testing. Additionally, there are non-medical 
benefits to carrier testing or predictive testing for disorders for which there are no 
effective medical interventions (e.g time, knowledge and opportunity to use the 
genetic information to make decisions and plan for the future).20 
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The issue is a subjective one for the minor to decide, not least because benefits 
can arise merely from respecting and acting upon a minor’s autonomous decision 
(enhanced autonomy and confidence). 
Regardless of the benefits and harms, the significant competence and autonomy of 
sixteen and seventeen-year-olds requires that they be able to make these decisions for 
themselves, in accordance with the purpose of the consent provision in section 36(1) 
of the COCA 2004. 
2.  genetic testing of competent minors under the age of sixteen
2.4.1  The COCA 2004
While minors of or over the age of sixteen have a statutory right to consent to or 
refuse medical treatment, the COCA 2004 is silent as to what rights, if any, minors 
under the age of sixteen have in respect of consenting to medical treatment. 
Section 13 of the COCA 2004 indicates that the Act is a code and, except as otherwise 
expressly provided in the Act, it exists in place of the rules of the common law and 
of equity as to the guardianship and custody of children. In matters not provided for 
by the Act, the High Court maintains all the powers in respect of children that it had 
immediately before the commencement of the Guardianship Act 1968 (on 1 January 
1970). 
In terms of consent to medical treatment, section 36(5) of the COCA 2004 states that 
nothing in section 36 affects an enactment or rule of law by or under which, in any 
circumstances, no consent or no express consent is necessary; or the consent of the 
child in addition to that of any other person is necessary; or (except for where a child 
is or has been married or in a civil union or de facto relationship) the consent of any 
other person instead of the consent of the child is sufficient. 
2.4.2  Gillick
The seminal common law judgment on the capacity of persons under the age 
of sixteen to seek and consent to medical treatment is Gillick	 v	West	 Norfolk	 and	
Wisbech	Area	Health	Authority	and	another,21 the first authoritative judicial statement 
recognising children’s evolving capacities. 
The central issue before the House of Lords was whether a doctor could ever lawfully 
give contraceptive advice or treatment to a girl under the age of sixteen without a 
parent’s knowledge or consent. 
Mrs Gillick had taken exception to a Department of Health and Social Security 
(DHSS) Health Service notice that stated, or implied, that, at least in certain 
‘exceptional’ cases, a doctor could lawfully prescribe contraception for a girl under 
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sixteen without her parent’s knowledge or consent. The Court of Appeal granted Mrs 
Gillick declarations to the effect that: the DHSS notice had no authority in law and 
gave advice which was unlawful, wrong and adversely affected or might affect the 
welfare of Mrs Gillick’s children, and/or Mrs Gillick’s rights as parent and custodian 
of the children, and/or her ability to properly and effectively discharge her duties 
as parent and custodian; and that no doctor or other professional employed by the 
Area Health Authority give any contraceptive advice and/or abortion advice and/
or treatment to any of Mrs Gillick’s children below the age of sixteen without Mrs 
Gillick’s prior knowledge and consent. 
The House of Lords (by a majority judgment of 3–2) overturned the Court of 
Appeal’s decision and essentially decided that minors under the age of sixteen 
could be sufficiently competent in some cases to give valid legal consent to medical 
treatment. The majority judges reached their conclusions via differing rationales. 
Lord Fraser considered the two major questions to be: (1) whether a girl under the 
age of sixteen had the legal capacity to give valid consent to contraceptive advice 
and treatment, including medical treatment; and (2) whether giving such advice and 
treatment to a girl under the age of sixteen without her parents’ consent infringed 
the parents’ rights.22 He answered the first question in the affirmative, there being no 
statutory bar to recognising the legal capacity of those under the age of sixteen to give 
valid consent, and not being disposed to ‘hold now, for the first time, that a girl aged 
less than 16 lacks the power to give valid consent to contraceptive advice or treatment, 








To answer the second question Lord Fraser turned to study parents’ rights and duties 




Lord Fraser surmised that it was ‘contrary to the ordinary experience of mankind’24 to 
say that a child was under the complete control of his parents until he reached the age 
of majority, and that upon attaining that age he suddenly acquired independence. 
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In	practice	most	wise	parents	relax	their	control	gradually	as	the	child	develops	
and	 encourage	him	or	her	 to	become	 increasingly	 independent.	Moreover,	 the	
degree	 of	 parental	 control	 actually	 exercised	 over	 a	 particular	 child	 does	 in	
practice	vary	considerably	according	to	his	understanding	and	intelligence	and	
it	 would	 …	 be	 unrealistic	 for	 the	 courts	 not	 to	 recognise	 these	 facts	 (at	 411).	
(Emphasis	added.)25	
Lord Fraser appeared to be more concerned with the welfare of minors than with 
recognising their competence and rights to make or be involved in decisions affecting 
them. Having established that parents did not have absolute authority over minor 
children, Fraser LJ determined that the welfare of the particular child was the 
most important consideration in situations such as these, and that ‘there may be 
circumstances in which a doctor is a better judge of the medical advice and treatment 
which will conduce to a child’s welfare than her parents’ (at 412). Lord Fraser was 
cognizant of the fact that minors were ‘often reluctant to confide in their parents 
about sexual matters’ and that the abandonment of confidentiality in such matters 
‘might cause some of them not to seek professional advice at all’ (at 412). The ‘only 
practicable course’ was to entrust doctors with the discretion to act in accordance 
with their views of what was in the best interests of the minor patient; although 
doctors should always seek to persuade child patients to disclose the situation to their 
parents (at 413).26 
Lord Scarman agreed with Lord Fraser but thought it necessary to deliver his own 
opinion because of the importance of the case (p 414). His Lordship considered that 
the issue arose ‘from the interaction of parental right and a doctor’s duty’ (p 414). ‘The 
question … is as to the extent and duration of the (parental) right, and the circumstances 
in which … it can be overridden by the exercise of medical judgment’ (at 420). 
Lord Scarman stated that while parental rights clearly existed and did not entirely 
disappear until the child reached the age of majority, the common law had never 
treated those rights as ‘sovereign or beyond review and control’. 




Lord Scarman’s review of the relevant common law highlighted judicial attention to 
the understanding of minors when considering their capacities in various scenarios. 
His lordship relied upon the same statements (as Lord Fraser had) in Blackstone’s 









The rationale for Lord Scarman’s conclusion appears to be that minors of ‘sufficient 
understanding and intelligence’ can consent to contraceptive advice or treatment 
on the basis of their own competence to give legally effective consent (rather than 
because not requiring parental consent might be more practical, or in a minor’s best 
interests, as appears to be Lord Fraser’s rationale). 
The third majority judgment, delivered by Lord Bridge, focuses largely on 
jurisdictional and procedural issues. With regard to the substantive question of 
whether a minor under the age of sixteen years can give a legally valid consent to 
contraceptive treatment his Lordship simply stated that he fully agreed with the 
reasons expressed by both Lords Fraser and Scarman (p 425). 
Lord Templeman delivered the major dissenting judgment.28 His Lordship framed 
the question before the House most succinctly: ‘ … this appeal involves consideration 
of the independence of a teenager, the powers of a parent and the duties of a doctor. 
The question is: who has the right to decide whether an unmarried girl under the age 
of 16 may practice contraception?’ 
Although Lord Templeman began by stating ‘An unmarried girl under the age of 16 
does not, in my opinion, possess the power in law to decide for herself to practise 
contraception’ (p 431), his Lordship opined that minors under the age of sixteen 




and	 understanding	 of	 the	 infant.	 For	 example,	 a	 doctor	 with	 the	 consent	 of	
an	 intelligent	boy	or	girl	of	15	could	 in	my	opinion	 safely	 remove	 tonsils	or	a	
troublesome	appendix	(p	432).	
However, Lord Templeman did not consider that girls under the age of sixteen could be 
competent to consent to contraceptive advice or treatment: ‘ … any decision on the part 
of a girl to practise sex and contraception requires not only knowledge of the facts of life 
and of the dangers of pregnancy and disease but also an understanding of the emotional 
and other consequences to her family, her male partner and to herself ’ (p 432).
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Templeman, LJ supported his argument by reference to the criminal law provisions that 
made sexual intercourse with girls under the age of sixteen unlawful. Parliament had 
deemed that such a girl was not mature enough to consent to sexual intercourse, the 
potential harms of which contraception was aimed at alleviating; by implication nor 
could she have the maturity to give valid consent in matters related to contraception 
(p 431). Lord Templeman’s opposition to minors under the age of sixteen giving 
effective consent to contraceptive advice or treatment was very much focused on the 
specifics of the issue of sexual activity and contraception: ‘the regular, frequent or 
casual practice of sexual intercourse by a girl or boy under the age of 16 cannot be 
beneficial to anybody and may cause harm to character and personality’ (p 433). 
Illuminating the ratio	decidendi of the Gillick	decision is made somewhat difficult 
given the different foci in the five judgments. However, the following statement from 
Lord Scarman appears to best encapsulate what is meant by reference to the Gillick	
principle (in New Zealand at least):29 a minor under the age of sixteen can give legally 
effective consent to medical treatment if he or she has ‘sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed’ (p 423). 
This formulation of the principle is supported by the comments of Lord Fraser, the 
agreement of Lord Bridge with Lords Fraser and Scarman, and the similar comments 
given by Lord Templeman in his dissenting judgment.30 
It	 is	now	beyond	dispute	 that,	at	common	law,	capacity	 to	consent	 to	medical	
treatment	…	does	not	depend	on	someone	being	above	or	below	any	particular	
age.31
2.4.3  Gillick and procedures and treatment
Does the Gillick principle support the right of competent minors to consent to 
procedures, or only treatment? If the Gillick principle only applies to treatment and 
not ‘procedures’ then, arguably, those under the age of sixteen could not give valid 
consent to non-therapeutic genetic testing pursuant to Gillick. 
The intentions of the Law Lords appear to have been relatively disparate. Lord 
Scarman took a wide approach, advocating the rights of minors to make their own 
medical decisions when they were of sufficient understanding and intelligence to 
‘understand fully what is proposed’. However, others of his colleagues (notably Lords 
Fraser and Templeman) appeared to take a more welfare-focused approach to minors 
making their own medical decisions. Taking a welfare approach could result in denial 
of the right of competent minors to consent to medical procedures that are non-
therapeutic and not considered to be ‘treatment’.
However, on its most general formulation the Gillick principle does not restrict 
the right of competent minors to giving legally effective consent to treatment or 
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to beneficial procedures only. New Zealand Courts are not bound by the House of 
Lords’ judgment in Gillick, although the Gillick	principle has been used generally to 
recognise the competence of minors in a wide variety of circumstances.32 In particular, 
it was applied in the case of Re	SPO33 in which a fifteen-year-old minor was held to 
have sufficient understanding and intelligence to make his own decision on whether 
to receive a vaccination, which is a medical procedure rather than a treatment. 
The Code of Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
the existing practice surrounding children and medical decision-making in New 
Zealand, support the right of competent minors to make their own medical decisions, 
whether the decision be about a procedure	or a treatment. 
2.4.4  Gillick competency to consent and to refuse consent
The common law principle derived from Gillick is that minors under the age of sixteen 
may have sufficient competence to give valid legal consent to medical treatment. 
Such capacity to consent will depend on the ‘understanding and intelligence’ of the 
individual minor concerned. It is for health professionals (or in the extreme, the 
Courts) to assess whether a child is ‘Gillick competent’.
The principle of Gillick	 competency has been somewhat limited subsequently in 
England and Wales by the English Courts, and minors who might have or indeed 
who have been Gillick competent have had their refusals to consent, overridden. In 
particular, a couple of English Court of Appeal decisions34 very firmly stated that 
whilst minors under the age of sixteen could be competent to consent to certain 
kinds of medical treatments (pursuant to the Gillick	principle), they did not have 
equivalent rights to refuse to consent to treatment. 
It has been argued that:
In	all	of	the	above	decisions	the	court	considered	the	children’s	wishes	and	feelings	
and	that	they	should	be	given	increasing	weight	as	they	matured,	then	overrode	
them.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 Gillick	 competency	 is,	 in	 many	 ways,	
redundant	…35	
However, Gillick competency is far from redundant in the United Kingdom. The 
principle may have been watered down in England and Wales36 but the principle 
of Gillick competency to consent still exists and is endorsed and relied upon by the 
medical and legal communities.37 
To the extent that they state that minors of or over the age of sixteen can have their 
refusals of medical treatment overridden by a guardian’s consent the English Court 
of Appeal cases are not applicable to the New Zealand legal context.38 Section 36(1) 
of the COCA 2004 provides unambiguous legislative recognition of the right of 
minors aged sixteen or more to consent or refuse	consent to medical treatments as 
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if they were of full age. The right to refuse consent to treatment as if one was of full 
age means that such a right cannot be overridden by a parent (as a person of full age 
cannot have their consent or refusal overridden by a parent).
Those under the age of sixteen are not presumed competent by statute to give 
valid consent or refusal to consent.39 The Gillick	test was formulated in the context 
of consent to treatment, not refusal of consent. Some have argued that refusing 
treatment ‘involves a higher order of decision making (McCall-Smith, 1992), with 
often more serious implications than does consenting to treatment (Pearce, 1994)’.40 
For these reasons some might think it prudent that conferral of a minor’s right to 
refuse treatment be delayed longer than her right to consent. 
However, we agree with Elliston that:
	…	to	draw	a	distinction	between	 the	ability	 to	 consent	 to	 treatment	and	 the	























Section 36(1) of the COCA 2004 extends the rights of sixteen and seventeen-year-
olds to include the right to refuse consent to medical treatment. The right to refuse 
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consent was not in the previous Act (section 25, Guardianship Act 1969). The 
inclusion of the right to refuse procedures or treatment in section 36 suggests that in 
New Zealand consent and refusal of consent are seen as two sides of the same coin. 
It may therefore be inferred that if a minor under the age of sixteen is competent to 
make the relevant medical decision, the minor may consent or refuse consent. 
New Zealand’s Health and Disability Commissioner has previously argued that there 
has been much criticism of the finding in the English Court of Appeal case of Re	W	(A	
Minor)47 that it was possible to have both a refusal to consent by a competent minor 
and a contemporaneous valid consent by a guardian. He contended that it would be 
possible to avoid such a result in New Zealand by health professionals being cautious 
in their assessment of competency; and where the minor is found to be competent, 
relying on section 11 of the Bill of Rights, to come to the conclusion that the parents or 
guardians lose the right to give or withhold consent to treatment of that teenager.48 
A working group for the Paediatric Society of New Zealand and the Royal Australasian 
College of Physicians Board of Paediatrics and Child Health also surmised that it was 
not clear that New Zealand would follow the direction set by Re	W ‘particularly in 
light of the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights’.49 
2.4.5  Gillick and the COCA 2004 in New Zealand
Does the Care of Children Act 2004 ‘have the effect, in New Zealand law, of precluding 
reliance on common law capacity’50 and hence a minor or health professional’s 
reliance on Gillick? 
Section 13 of the COCA 2004 indicates that the Act is a Code and has effect in place 
of the rules of the common law as	to	the	guardianship	and	custody	of	children, except 
as otherwise expressly provided in the Act. However, 
The	common	law	capacity	of	children	to	consent	to	medical	(and	other)	touchings	
stands	 entirely	 apart	 from	 ‘the	 rules	 of	 the	 common	 law	 and	 equity	 as	 to	 the	
guardianship	and	custody	of	children’.51
Skegg further contends that section 36 was originally drafted to ‘enhance, rather than 
restrict, minors’ capacity to consent to medical treatment’.52 
Henaghan has argued that section 15 of the COCA 200453 preserves common law 
powers and duties, which Gillick turns upon. Thus the reasoning in Gillick can be 
argued to be applicable to New Zealand.54 Moreover, the codification existed in 
similar fashion in section 33 of the Guardianship Act 1968 (as did the definition 







In response to potential argument that the explicit conferral of a right to consent for 
sixteen-year-olds implies that those under the age of sixteen have no such right: 





Additionally, section 16(1)(c) of the COCA 2004 defines the duties, powers, rights 
and responsibilities of a guardian to include helping the child to determine questions 
about important matters affecting the child. This provides explicit statutory 
recognition of the minor child’s capacity to determine some important matters 
autonomously. 
While ‘there has not been a thorough examination of the issue in the High Court, 
much less at Court of Appeal or Supreme Court level’57 Gillick has been referred	
to in a broad spectrum of cases in the District Court, Family Court, High Court 
and the Court of Appeal. For example, the Gillick	 principle has been referred to 
by judges in the following contexts: protection order proceedings;58 child support 
proceedings brought by a seventeen-year-old;59 Hague Convention cases;60 religion 
and medical treatment cases;61 care and protection proceedings;62 criminal cases;63 
a case in which a fourteen-year-old did not want an access order granted in favour 
of her mother;64 summing up to the jury in a manslaughter/failing to provide the 
necessaries case;65 and, most recently, a case involving a fifteen-year-old minor’s 
consent to meningococcal vaccinations.66
The	House	of	Lords	decided	in	Gillick	…	that	when	a	child	reaches	a	sufficient	















The Guidelines to the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992 also recognise that:
A	child/young	person	under	the	age	of	16	years	may	give	valid	and	effective	consent,	





Likewise, the New Zealand Medical Association Code of Ethics stipulates that doctors 
must accept that autonomy of patients remains important in childhood, and that 
patients be involved ‘within the limits of their capacities’, in understanding the nature 
of their problems, the range of possible solutions, as well as the likely benefits, risks, 
and costs. Doctors must help assist minors to make informed choices.69 
The Ministry of Health Information for Practitioners regarding Consent in Child 
and Youth Health states that Gillick	is ‘generally accepted as binding for New Zealand 
courts’ and that the ‘Gillick test is reflected in the Code of Health and Disability 
Services Consumers’ Rights’.70 (See discussion later.)
We endorse Skegg’s conclusion that accepting that the common law capacity of 
minors is not extirpated by the COCA 2004 ‘would also have the benefit of avoiding 
any possible distinction between capacity for the purpose of Code liability71 and 
capacity for criminal and tortious liability’.72







How competency is actually to be defined and determined will be discussed further 
below alongside discussion of whether a higher degree of competency is required 
by minors in order to give a legally valid consent or refusal to consent to genetic 
testing. 
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2.4.6  Summary and conclusion: Gillick
The notion of Gillick competence to consent to medical treatment is applicable in 
New Zealand despite the fact that it was not incorporated into the COCA 2004. 
General practice, various legal instruments, and most of the academic writing in 
the area suggest that the Gillick	principle is applicable in New Zealand. The House 
of Lords decision has also often been referred to approvingly by the New Zealand 
judiciary and the Health and Disability Commissioner. The COCA 2004 does not 
rule out the possibility of those under the age of sixteen validly consenting to or 
refusing medical treatment. 
The fact that minors of or over the age of sixteen have the right to consent or refuse 
consent to treatment (pursuant to section 36(1) COCA 2004) indicates that in New 
Zealand competence to consent entails competence to refuse treatment also. Thus it 
may be inferred that minors under the age of sixteen can consent or refuse consent 
to medical procedures or treatment if they have the requisite degree of competence 
to make the decision. Assuming that a minor under the age of sixteen is Gillick	
competent, the minor can consent or refuse consent to genetic testing. How to define 
and interpret competency and whether a higher level of competence is required in 
respect of consenting to genetic testing is discussed later.
 
2.  the code of health and Disability services consumers’ rights  (the   
 code) and genetic testing of competent minors
The Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 1996 (The Code) 
was established by the Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) Regulations 1996.76
The Code applies to every health or disability services consumer, regardless of age.77 
The most important right in the Code in the context of competent minors and 




There is thus a rebuttable presumption in favour of all consumers, including minors, 
being competent to make an informed choice and give informed consent to medical 
‘services’, which means ‘health services, or disability services, or both, and includes 
health care procedures.’ Even if the Gillick principle was not considered applicable to 
‘procedures’, minors are presumed competent to consent to procedures pursuant to 
the Code.78 
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Age, particularly in respect of young children, can constitute a reasonable ground for 





However, as evidenced by the Gillick	judgment, it is a minor’s degree of ‘understanding 







The Code applies to everyone, regardless of age, and reinforces the right of competent 
minors to make their own medical choices. Even minors who might be presumed to 
have diminished competency because of their age, retain the right to make choices 
and give consent to the extent appropriate to their competence (right 7(3)).
The Ministry of Health (which is just one of a number of agencies and authors that 
have argued that the Code, with its strong emphasis on individual rights, reflects the 
notions behind Gillick81) has expressed that the absence of any specified age restrictions 
in the Code ‘is consistent with an approach that emphasises self-determination to the 
fullest possible extent’.82 






A health practitioner must judge whether a minor is competent to give informed 
consent to a particular procedure, based on her maturity and understanding, and the 
gravity of the procedure. 









As articulated in the common law, the ‘level of ability necessary to consent’ to a 






Whilst there have been many complaints made to the Health and Disability 
Commissioner (HDC) about providers not meeting their duties under the Code in 
respect of providing information and seeking informed consent, there are very few 
opinions or case notes dealing specifically with complaints as to treatment of a minor 
in reliance upon the minor’s consent only, without parental consent.
A relatively recent case note of the HDC referred to the ‘well established “competency 
based” assessment’ in Gillick when deciding whether Doctor C and Nurse D had 
breached the Code by treating a fourteen-year-old boy, Mr B, with a tetanus toxoid 














Right 7(7) of the Code gives consumers the right to refuse health services and to 
withdraw consent to services.88 Thus, pursuant to the Code, a minor has the right to 
consent or refuse consent to procedures or treatment if she is competent.89 
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According to right 7(1) of the Code services may be provided to a consumer only if 
that consumer makes an informed choice	and gives informed consent.90 ‘Informed 
consent’ means consent freely given, by the health consumer or, where applicable, 
by any person who is entitled to consent on the health consumer’s behalf (clause 
4). Consent given by a competent minor only under coercion or duress (perhaps by 
a parent or other family member) would thus not meet the threshold required for 
‘informed consent’ and would therefore not authorise health professionals to treat a 
minor in accordance with that consent. 
Informed consent is a process, not a single act and its components include: 
voluntariness, information and competency.91 In terms of the actual information 
required in order to facilitate informed consent:
 Right 6 Right to be fully informed
 (1) Every consumer has the right to the information that a reasonable consumer, 
 in that consumer’s circumstances, would expect to receive, including–
  (a) An explanation of his or her condition; and
  (b) An explanation of the options available, including an assessment of the  
  expected risks, side effects, benefits, and costs of each option; and
  (c) Advice of the estimated time within which the services will be provided;  
  and
  (d) Notification of any proposed participation in teaching or research,   
  including whether the research requires and has received ethical   
  approval; and
  (e) Any other information required by legal, professional, ethical, and other  
  relevant standards; and
  (f) The results of tests; and
  (g) The results of procedures.
 (2) Before making a choice92 or giving consent, every consumer has the right   
 to the information that a reasonable consumer, in that consumer’s   
 circumstances, needs to make an informed choice or give informed consent. ..
 (4) Every consumer has the right to receive, on request, a written summary of  
 information provided.
The criteria for the kind of information required in order for a person to be able to give 
informed consent are partly objective and partly subjective.93 The health-care provider 
must focus on the ability of the consumer to understand the information given.94 
Obtaining truly informed consent is an area of particular concern in genetic testing, 
given the complexity of genetic information. This is discussed in more detail later.
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Related, right 5 provides that: every consumer has the right to effective communication 
in a form, language, and manner that enables the consumer to understand the 
information provided; and every consumer has the right to an environment that 
enables both consumer and provider to communicate openly, honestly, and 
effectively.
Creating an appropriate environment for minors in which to impart information 
and answer questions about medical decisions
…	 might	 include	 one-on-one	 or	 group	 discussions	 in	 which	 appropriate	 time	
is	 allowed	 for	 questions	 to	 be	 asked,	 and	 honest	 and	 accurate	 answers	 given.	




Right 8 of the Code gives every consumer the right to have one or more support 
persons of her choice present.96 Adolescent minors might prefer a friend or adult 
outside her family to as a support person. This might be particularly so in the genetic 
testing context when the information revealed by the test may reveal information 
about other family members’ risk status. 
The Code, like Gillick, gives competent minors of any age the right to make an 
informed choice and give informed consent (or refuse consent) to genetic testing. 
Genetic information and the testing process and its implications must be explained 
to minors in a manner and language which they can understand.
2.  new Zealand Bill of rights act 0 and genetic testing of minors
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) applies only to acts done by: (a) 
the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government; or (b) any person or 
body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed 
by or pursuant to law (section 3). Organisations operating in different spheres of 
activity may be subject to the NZBORA as a result of applying the public function 
test (section 3(b)) e.g. District Health Boards and Medical Councils.97
Subject to section 4,98 the rights and freedoms in the NZBORA are subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society (section 5). And, wherever an enactment can be given a meaning 
that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA, that 
meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning (section 6). ‘Section 6 is designed to 
avoid a situation envisaged by section 4.’99 
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Section 11 of the NZBORA affirms the right to refuse medical treatment. Everybody 
has the rights in the NZBORA, regardless of age. However, pursuant to the ruling in 
Re	S100 a person must be competent to rely on her section 11 right to refuse medical 
treatment.101 The NZBORA does not stipulate criteria for assessing competence in 
terms of the right to refuse. In Re	S	Barker J implied that competence was related to 
appreciating the significance of the relevant treatment.102 Thus the Gillick	principle 
appears to apply to the section 11 right to refuse treatment.103 
The HDC has previously argued that pursuant to Gillick and section 11 of the 
NZBORA, if a young person under the age of sixteen is mature enough to refuse 
consent to a health-care procedure then that refusal is fully effective (provided it 
was not coerced of course) and cannot be overridden by the wishes of parents or 
guardians.104 
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Guidelines	on	the	New	Zealand	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990	
acknowledge, in line with the Code, that: 
every	person	of	diminished	competence	has	the	right	to	grant	informed	consent	
to	 or	 to	 refuse	 treatment	 to	 the	 extent	 appropriate	 to	 the	 person’s	 level	 of	
competence.105
The right to refuse treatment can be limited only to the extent necessary to serve the 
specific purpose of the limitation, and moreover ‘limitations to the application of 
section 11 should be set out explicitly in statute and will be read strictly’.106 According 
to the Guidelines ‘if Parliament wishes to override basic rights, it needs to do so by 
using clear and unambiguous language’.107 Neither the COCA 2004 nor any other 
statute explicitly limits the right of a minor under the age of sixteen to refuse medical 
treatment.108
Consequently, it would appear that competent minors under the age of sixteen can 
rely on their section 11 right to refuse treatment. Section 36(1) of the COCA 2004 is 
to be interpreted consistently with the rights contained in the NZBORA. Therefore, 
it should not be interpreted as implicitly limiting the right of those under the age 
of sixteen to refuse treatment.109 Additionally, where health professionals or health 
boards are exercising a ‘public function’ (section 3(b) NZBORA) and are faced 
with discretion as to a course of action (such as whether or not to test a competent 
fourteen-year-old who refuses to consent to predictive testing), ‘the person exercising 
the discretion needs to exercise that authority in a way that is consistent with the Bill of 
Rights Act’.110 On a simple analysis, where there are no other competing rights or clear 
statutory rules, this would mean respecting the minor’s right to refuse treatment.
According to the MOJ the right to refuse medical treatment extends to ‘all forms 
of health care and medical intervention’ and ‘serves to maintain a person’s bodily 
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integrity, and human dignity’.111 A person has a right to refuse treatment even 
if the decision may be considered to be irrational, objectively medically unsound 
or contrary their best interests.112 The right to refuse medical treatment, on this 
formulation, clearly extends to the right to refuse a genetic test.
Competent minors (whether presumed competent by statute, or Gillick	competent) 
can rely upon section 11 of the NZBORA to refuse consent to a genetic test.
2.7  the united nations convention on the rights of the child (uncroc) and  
 genetic testing of minors
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989. It is the most widely ratified human 
rights convention in the world, unratified by just two countries.113 
Many of UNCROC’s fifty-four articles are relevant in the context of medical-decision-
making and children, both with regard to adults’ responsibilities to act in children’s 
best interests, and also with regard to the need to let children participate in decisions 
affecting them.114 
Article 1 defines a child as every human below the age of eighteen years unless, under 
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.
Article 3 requires adherence to the best interests of the child as a primary consideration 
in all public actions concerning children, and that States Parties undertake to ensure 
the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking 
into account the rights and duties of his or her guardians. Note that the MOH urges 
caution that the ‘best interests’ principle is not used to indiscriminately override 





This is relevant in terms of genetic testing and competent minors: a competent 
minor’s request for a genetic test should not be overridden on the basis that the test 
may not be in her best interests. 
Article 5 requires respect for the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents (or 
others legally responsible for the child) to provide, in a manner consistent with the 
evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise 
by the child of the rights recognised. Recognising the right of a competent minor to 
consent to a medical procedure does not necessarily mean completely ignoring family 
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input: it is natural for families to have input into a decision regarding a heritable 
genetic condition, and many competent minors will want this involvement. 
Article 12 is often referred to as the bedrock of UNCROC:116   
States	Parties	shall	assure	to	the	child	who	is	capable	of	forming	his	or	her	own	
views	 the	 right	 to	 express	 those	 views	 freely	 in	 all	 matters	 affecting	 the	 child,	
the	views	of	 the	 child	being	given	due	weight	 in	accordance	with	 the	age	and	
maturity	of	the	child.	
Minors are clearly capable of forming their own views on a variety of matters and 
many of them are also competent to make their own medical decisions. Article 12 
underscores the Gillick	 principle and the Code of Rights in insisting that minors’ 
views be given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity. 
Article 24 calls upon States Parties to recognise the right of the child to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness 
and rehabilitation of health. Arguably this article supports the right of competent 
minors to seek genetic testing so that they may enjoy the highest attainable standard 
of health: predictive testing might afford them an early opportunity for surveillance, 
prophylaxis, and interventions.
Further, States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of the right of 
access to health care services. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this 
right and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures to combat disease, including 
within the framework of primary health care, through, inter	 alia, the application 
of readily available technology; and to develop preventative health care, guidance 
for parents and family planning education and services. These explicit references to 
the application of readily available technology to assist in combating disease, and 
the development of preventative health care, further support the right of competent 
minors to access genetic testing technology. 
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child has recently stated that 
children should themselves be included from an early age in activities promoting 
a healthy and disease-preventing lifestyle.117 Similarly, the New Zealand MOH has 
stated that article 24 should also guide how matters of consent in relation to children 
are approached. The ways in which informed consent of children and/or parents 
and families/whānau is sought, and decisions about treatment of children are made 
‘should enhance and not inhibit the child’s opportunity to get the best health care 
available for their particular circumstance’. 118 
Many of the UNCROC Articles expressly require assessment of the particular child’s 
age and/or maturity when decision-making in certain areas, reflecting the familiar 
concepts of evolving capacity and different rates of maturation and development 
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amongst different children (as promoted in Gillick and elsewhere).119 Article 12 is key 
in this respect (see earlier discussion).
Despite being a Schedule to the Children’s Commissioner Act 2003, UNCROC has 
not been incorporated into New Zealand law and cannot be directly enforced through 
the New Zealand Courts.120 However, there are many valid and strong incentives, 
policies and statements in place to encourage compliance with UNCROC.121 
UNCROC has been judicially considered in New Zealand in Tavita	 v	 Minister	 of	
Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257, 266: 
…	the	United	Nations	Human	Rights	Committee	is	in	a	sense	part	of	this	country’s	
judicial	structure,	in	that	individuals	subject	to	New	Zealand	jurisdiction	have	
direct	 rights	of	 recourse	 to	 it.	A	 failure	 to	give	practical	 effect	 to	 international	
instruments	to	which	New	Zealand	is	a	party	may	attract	criticism.	Legitimate	









Several of UNCROC’s articles support the right of competent minors to consent 
or refuse consent to genetic testing in accordance with their level of competency or 
maturity. 
2.  comments on new Zealand’s general legal context regarding genetic testing  
 and competent minors
The legal framework outlined earlier in respect of competent minors and medical 
decision-making lends support to the argument that competent minors in New 
Zealand have the right to give informed consent or refuse consent to genetic testing.
Minors of or over the age of sixteen have the statutory right to consent or refuse 
consent to genetic testing by virtue of section 36(1) of the COCA 2004. Even if their 
rights are confined to treatments or procedures that are to their benefit, we conclude 
that they would still be entitled to consent to genetic testing, because the most recent 
and extensive evidence (discussed earlier) points towards clear benefits arising from 
genetic testing of minors on the basis of their own informed consent. 
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Minors under the age of sixteen are not covered by section 36(1) of the COCA 2004. 
However, if they are competent they can also make medical decisions on their own 
behalf, pursuant to Gillick,	the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ 
Rights, and UNCROC. The right of minors under the age of sixteen to refuse consent 
has been more controversial in the past. However, Gillick, the Code	of Rights, the 
NZBORA and the equal treatment of the right to consent and the right to refuse in 
section 36(1) of the COCA 2004 all support the right of a competent minor under 
the age of sixteen to refuse consent to medical procedures or treatment.
Competent minors of any age in New Zealand can give legally effective informed 
consent, or refuse to consent, to genetic testing. 
we next examine the question of whether genetic testing decisions  
require a higher degree of competence than other medical decisions,  
and how a minor’s competence can be assessed.
  comPetence anD genetic testing oF minors
From the perspective of genetic screening, for doctors to proceed on a young person’s 
request would seem to require a finding of a high level of maturity, given that the 
nature and consequences of screening are much more complex than decisions 
involving a young person’s desire to avoid an unwanted pregnancy.123
As discussed earlier, minors who have not yet reached the statutory age of consent 
to medical treatment (sixteen, section 36(1), COCA 2004) can consent and refuse 
consent to medical treatments or procedures, including predictive or carrier testing, 
when they are competent to do so. But what does competence mean in this context, 
and how can it be assessed? Should a greater degree of competence be required by 
minors requesting or refusing genetic tests because of the complexity of genetic 
information, and the far-reaching consequences for the adolescent’s future well-
being and lifestyle? 
.  what is competence?
Common definitions of ‘competent’ (e.g. ‘having requisite or adequate ability or 
qualities’ or being ‘legally qualified or adequate’124) are inadequate to describe what is 
meant by competence in the medico-legal sense. 
Legally, competence or legal capacity125 can be defined in two ways in respect of 
minors:
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	 capacity.	But	the	minor’s	competence	cannot	be	denied	solely	on		 	 	
	 the	basis	of	age.)	




The second form of competence is of the most interest in this section, given that the 
first is relatively straightforward and has already been discussed earlier.127 
.2  the connection between competence and autonomy
Respect for autonomy is the fundamental reason for allowing competent persons to 
make their own decisions. 
The	treatment	choices	of	competent	adults	should	be	respected	…	provided	that	
the	 choice	 is	 made	 with	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 probable	 consequences.	 …	
The	primary	justification	for	this	is	respect	for	the	autonomy	of	persons	–	their	
rights	of	self-determination.	This	can	be	defended	as	a	basic	right,	or	by	appeal	
to	 claims	 that	an	ordinary	adult,	when	 informed	about	 the	options	available,	
knows	best	what	actions	fit	 their	own	value	 system	and	hence	best	meet	 their	
overall	needs.128	
The same theory applies to competent minors – respecting their choices respects their 
autonomy to make their own decisions about their lives. Indeed, it is often argued that 
allowing minors to exercise their autonomy and make their own decisions enhances 
their ability to do so, and also their competence.129 
Another	reason	for	listening	to	children	is	that	they	are	not	well-served	by	being	
voiceless	until	the	age	of	majority.	They	do	not	emerge	from	a	cocoon	at	age	18	
with	 full	 blown	 decision-making	 capacity;	 rather	 their	 abilities	 to	 make	 good	
choices	must	be	developed	over	time,	a	process	that	requires	practice.130	
…	permitting	minors	 to	 exercise	 their	 right	 to	make	 treatment	decisions	may	
actually	 assist	 them	 in	 ‘developing	 decision-making	 competence	 with	 respect	
to	 legal	 issues	 and	 life	 choices,	 enabling	 them	 gradually	 to	 assume	 adult	
responsibilities’.131	
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Recognising that competence is linked with autonomy and self-determination assists 
in assessing competence.
.  the connection between competence and informed consent 
Pursuant to the Code, health and disability services can be ‘provided to a consumer 
only if that consumer makes an informed choice and gives informed consent, except 
where any enactment, or the common law, or any other provision of this Code 
provides otherwise’.132
Informed consent is only legally effective when it is voluntary; informed; and given 
by a competent person.133 A minor cannot give legally effective informed consent 
unless competent to do so, and consent is given voluntarily. Being judged competent 
(whether statutorily or on the basis of maturity) is therefore vital in order for a minor 
to exercise her autonomy in relation to medical decisions, including decisions about 
genetic testing. 
3.3.1  Voluntariness
Consent given by a competent minor only under coercion or duress (perhaps by a 
parent or other family member) would not meet the threshold required for ‘informed 
consent’ and would therefore not authorise health professionals to treat a minor in 
accordance with that consent.
Genetic testing for heritable disorders may raise more issues around voluntariness 
and the possibility of family pressure or coercion to have a test, than do other medical 
tests for non-heritable disorders. The fact that other members of the family suffer 
from the heritable condition creates an inextricable link between their genetic 
relationships and their emotional relationships,134 and may increase their desire to 
find out the genetic status of other family members (whether for altruistic or other 
motives). As outlined in the section on genetic testing of children too young to give 
their own informed consent, parents may wish to have their children tested for a 
number of reasons. Children or adolescents may be particularly susceptible to family 
pressure for testing. 
However, recognising the competence of a minor to consent to a medical procedure 
does not mean ignoring or discouraging family input: it is natural for families to have 
















Additionally, it has been argued that ‘Failure to provide adequate time or facilities 
to receive and reflect on information may be coercive, even if unintentionally so’.137 
As well as the right to be free from coercion (right 2), recall that right 5 of the Code 
stipulates that ‘Every consumer has the right to an environment that enables both 
consumer and provider to communicate openly, honestly, and effectively’. Thus 
health professionals must provide an adequate environment in which the minor can 
communicate honestly and effectively, without feeling coerced. 
3.3.2  Information
[There	are]	…	two,	often	confused,	elements	inherent	in	the	notion	of	‘informed	
consent’	 at	 common	 law.	 One	 aspect	 concerns	 information	 disclosure	 and	 the	
quality	of	the	information	imparted.	The	second	concerns	actual	consent	and	the	
requirements	of	capacity	(or	competence)	and	voluntariness.138	
All health and disability services consumers have the right to be fully informed, 
whether or not they will be giving consent on their own behalf. Information giving is 
separate from consent: even if a minor is not competent to give a valid consent, she 
has a right to receive appropriate information.139 
The information that every health consumer is entitled to (stipulated in right 6 of the 
Code) gives an indication of what kinds of information a person needs to understand 
in order to be competent to give informed consent: 



















However, note that competence concerns the ability	 to understand and cannot be 
exactly equated to the same level of understanding required in order to give informed 
consent, in that actual understanding and the giving of informed consent may very 
much depend upon the information given by the health professional and the manner 
in which is it given:






Thus a minor can be competent without being in a position to give informed consent, 
but cannot give informed consent without being competent.
Information must be given to minors in a way that they can understand.142 Right 5 of 
the Code provides that: every consumer has the right to effective communication in a 
form, language, and manner that enables the consumer to understand the information 
provided; and every consumer has the right to an environment that enables both 











Creating an appropriate environment for minors in which to impart information and 
answer questions about medical decisions might include one-on-one discussions
in	which	appropriate	time	is	allowed	for	questions	to	be	asked,	and	honest	and	
accurate	answers	given.	It	may	also	involve	using	…	plain	language	rather	than	
medical	 jargon;	 written	 or	 visual	 explanations;	 and	 diagrams	 …	 or	 videos.	
The	 involvement	of	 family,	whänau	or	 other	 support	 persons	may	 often	be	 of	
assistance	to	aid	understanding.144
.  Does genetic information make a difference? 
Genetic	susceptibility	testing	…	may	present	particular	challenges	to	the	informed	
consent	 process	 because	 of	 the	 probabilistic	 nature	 of	 genetic	 information,	 the	
impact	of	genetic	information	on	an	entire	family,	and	children’s	incomplete	or	
inaccurate	understanding	of	heredity	and	the	disease	in	their	family.145
3.4.1  Uncertainty of genetic information
There is a great deal of residual uncertainty regarding the interpretation of predictive 
genetic test results. When genetic mutations are not fully penetrant, and only indicate 
susceptibility to a disorder, the risk of developing the associated disorder may vary 
according to a number of factors e.g. the particular gene(s)/genetic variation(s) in 
question; the total genetic environment;146 the family history; and environmental 
factors. Further factors that might affect a person’s likelihood of getting a particular 
disorder remain unknown.
Research into how adults make decisions relating to genetic risk indicates that 
decision-making is not done on normative logical information-processing grounds: 
‘decisions are subject to the simplified short-cuts and biases typical of judgements 
under uncertainty’.147 
…evidence	is	accumulating	that	we	have	limited	abilities	to	process	information,	




Thus Binedell suggests that when more is known about the actual decision-making 
processes of adults, there may be ‘a lesser gap in competence between adults, 
adolescents and children than current theory suggests’.149
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Even if a genetic mutation is predictive or fully penetrant, the genetic test results 
cannot always, at least at this stage, predict how severe the expressivity of the disorder 
will be in the particular person tested. It is very difficult to predict how mild or 
how severe the disorder will present in the person tested. Additionally, there are no 
guarantees as to the age of onset of any of these types of conditions. These issues arise 
in the context of genetic testing of adults also; they are not unique to minors. Health 
professionals need to manage the explanation of genetic test results and genetic 
information that may contain many uncertainties. Explaining the uncertainties of 
the results and the information forms part of their obligations pursuant to the Code, 





The complexity of genetic information and the incomplete understanding of genetics 
create challenges in terms of the information-giving component of informed consent. 
Genetics is a highly specialised branch of medical science, not well understood 
even by health professionals outside of the speciality,151 let alone the general public. 
Ensuring that minors and families understand not just the clinical but also the ethical 
and potentially social and legal consequences of having a test for a genetic disorder 
is of vital importance. 
The fact that genetic information might be more complex than other types of health 
information means that health professionals need to take great care in explaining the 
information in a form, language and manner that minors can understand. They must 
focus on the ability of the minor to understand. 
Minors can be given sufficient information via a variety of methods to enable them 
to make an informed choice about genetic testing. They do not need lectures in 
medical genetics or inheritance, just as adults are not expected to understand such 
complexities when they seek testing. Some intelligent minors, in particular, will have 
no greater difficulty understanding the basic genetics of their condition, and its 
implications, than less intelligent adults would have. The complexity of the genetic 
information simply provides challenge to professionals to meet their obligations 
under the Code and convey the information in a manner and form that minors will 
be able to understand. If medical genetics could not be translated into a relatively 
easily understandable format, genetic testing, even of adults, could never take place 
on the basis of informed consent. The format in which genetic information is 
conveyed to adults simply needs to be adapted to be more user-friendly for minors, 
whilst retaining its accuracy. 
22
The consequences of genetic information may be more complex than other medical 
information, given its ability to predict the future health of an asymptomatic 
individual, with varying degrees of certainty. Part of informing minors adequately 
before they make a decision about testing will include informing them about the 
potential uses of their genetic information by third parties.152 Adolescents will 
generally be capable of understanding this type of information, but may never have 





3.4.3  Evidence of minors’ understanding of genetic information
In a study aimed at assessing adolescents’ attitudes towards genetic testing, Harel et 
al.154 found that:
• High school students with a mean age of 17 ± 1 years with a family history 
of breast cancer or high cholesterol were significantly more willing to have 
predictive testing for a familial breast cancer or hypercholesterolaemia (high 
blood cholesterol) than students without a family history. Thus students clearly 
understood that a family history of a heritable genetic mutation put them at 
greater risk for developing the relevant condition themselves. Likewise, students 
in the ethnic risk groups for Tay-Sachs disease were significantly more willing to 
be tested than those who were not in the high risk groups.155
• The majority of students surveyed also indicated that they would respond to 
a potential finding of high cholesterol, as a result of a hypercholesterolaemia 
test, by changing their diet and increasing their physical activity. Girls who 
wished to be tested for a familial breast cancer mutation stated that if they 
received a positive result they would submit to frequent breast examinations 
and to early mammograms. Both of these outcomes indicate that the students 
comprehended the implications of the genetic test result. 156
• Regardless, of whether or not the students would actually go through with 
genetic testing, if offered, they understood that they were at increased risk and 
what measures could be taken after a positive test result to manage or reduce the 
increased risk.157
Evaluation of an Australian programme of Tay-Sachs disease and cystic fibrosis 
carrier screening of 629 students (of a possible 817, 77 per cent) between the ages 
of fifteen to seventeen years in four private Jewish high schools in Sydney in the 
late 1990s, found that 99 per cent of the students who chose to participate in the 
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programme had good knowledge to enable informed consent (after education and 
a one on one interview session). Additionally, students appeared to understand the 
potential use of the knowledge and indicated their intentions to use the knowledge 
rationally in future reproductive decisions.158 Three to six years later, there was a high 
retention of knowledge.159
Further research on the Montreal Tay-Sachs carrier screening programme suggested 
that many minors can effectively use genetic information attained during high school 
years in later reproductive decisions. 
This	 analysis	 shows	 no	 negative	 effects	 of	 knowledge	 of	 carrier	 status,	 and	
demonstrates	 that	 adolescents	 both	 remember	 information	 regarding	 their	
carrier	status	and	use	it	in	an	appropriate,	mature	manner.160	
The minors studied by Michie et al. (discussed earlier in the ‘Benefits and harms’ 
section) understood the meaning of their positive FAP test results: minors with positive 
results perceived a higher change of getting polyposis, worried more about that chance 
and were more threatened by their test results than those who received negative results. 
There was no difference between minors and adults in how bad they considered 
polyposis to be, or how bad they thought it would be if they developed it.161 
Many comments made by the young people that Duncan interviewed (discussed 
earlier) also indicate understanding of the implications of the genetic information 




I	was	 thinking	of	 going	 into	 the	airforce	but	 I	 can’t	do	 that	now	…	I’ve	been	
thinking	about	being	a	sports	teacher.163
In a study of parents’ and children’s attitudes toward the enrolment of minors in 
genetic susceptibility research, Bernhardt et al found that while minors (aged between 
ten and seventeen years) were initially immediately agreeable to genetic testing and 
saw few risks (when such was undertaken with a saliva sample, rather than a blood 
sample) they began to identify the risks of testing as they were talked through the 
implications.164 They were encouraged to personalise the implications. 
Children	at	 risk	 for	heart	disease	perceived	a	benefit	of	being	 told	 they	had	a	
positive	genetic	test	result	because	they	could	then	do	something	to	prevent	heart	
disease,	such	as	exercising	more,	eating	better,	or	losing	weight,	even	if	they	were	
already	 engaged	 in	 risk	 reduction	 behaviors	 …	 Girls	 at	 risk	 for	 breast	 cancer	
would	do	something	to	detect	breast	cancer	early.165	
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Many of the minors at risk for heart disease or breast cancer also wanted to know 
whether they were at increased risk so that they could psychologically prepare for a 
diagnosis, and gain some control over aspects of their lives.166
Minors began to identify potential harms of testing when the interviewer asked them 
whether they would want their test results. Around a quarter of the thirty-seven 
minors interviewed indicated that they would worry if they received a positive test 
result. Others thought that knowledge would be better than uncertainty, even if they 
did worry. 
Only two of the minors from families at risk for heart disease would not want their 
results, compared to six from families at risk for breast cancer: children were less 
likely to want their results if they thought that the condition could not be prevented. 
Other minors suggested that they would not want their test results if they indicated 
a probability rather than certainty that they would develop the disorder: they would 
not want to worry unnecessarily, or to be caught off-guard. 
Children	also	expressed	many	concerns	about	the	privacy	of	their	test	results	and	
felt	that	they	should	have	control	over	who	knew	their	results.167	
Except for one minor who indicated that she would not want anyone to know, all 
of the children said that they would want their parents and doctors to know their 
results. Almost half of the children (eighteen of the thirty-seven) would want other 
adult relatives to know their results, and half would tell at least one friend, with 
several indicating they would tell multiple friends. Three minors did not care who 
knew their results. 
Reasons for sharing of the results included the recipient of the information having 
a good reason to know so that, for example, he or she could provide medical help or 
psychosocial support or information. Reasons to keep the results private included 
not wanting to be treated differently – minors at risk for heart disease in particular 
did not want to have their activities restricted.168
Here then is evidence that minors, some as young as ten years of age, can understand 
not only the medical, but also the longer-term and the psychosocial and privacy 
implications of genetic information. 
The discussion of minors’ understanding of genetic information shows that the 
process of educating minors about genetic testing, and exploring and personalising 
the longer term implications of testing for them is a useful method of conveying the 
information that they need to understand in order to give informed consent. 
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.  in what circumstances might it be necessary to assess a minor’s competence  
 to give informed consent?
Health professionals may need to assess the competence of a minor under the age 
of sixteen in many different circumstances. It might be necessary to assess a minor’s 
competence to give informed consent when a minor under the age of sixteen is: 
seeking treatment on her own (or at least without her parents or legal guardians); 
seeking treatment with the support of her parents or legal guardians; or seeking or 
refusing treatment against the wishes of her parents or legal guardians.169
When a minor under the age of sixteen is seeking treatment on her own then the 
health professional will need to assess whether she is competent to give informed 
consent on her own behalf to the treatment that she is seeking: or whether the consent 
of her guardians is required.
When a minor under the age of sixteen is seeking a procedure or treatment with 
the support of her parents and/or family, health professionals should nonetheless 
encourage her to exercise her autonomy by participating in or making the decision, 
giving her the opportunity to be responsible for herself and her own body.170 
Some of the professional position statements on genetic testing of minors, for 
example, the Australian NHMRC Information Paper, suggest that where both the 
young person and her parents agreed to testing, her parents’ informed consent could 
be relied on as legally effective. In practice, the matter may be academic, as the health 
professional needs only one legally effective consent to treat; and yet it may be wise 
to get both the young person and the parents’ consent in writing in the genetic 
testing context, so all parties take ownership of the decision. The competent minor’s 
informed consent, however, would be sufficient to act upon. 
However, it is also important to keep in mind that some minors may not want to 
make the decision: they may want the responsibility removed from them.171 The HTA 
Code of Practice on Consent (2006) states that parents can give consent on behalf 
of their competent children if they choose not to make the decision.172 The same is 
the case in New Zealand. While the health professional could rely on the competent 
minor’s legally effective informed consent, he can also rely upon the parents’ legally 
effective informed consent if the minor wishes to defer responsibility to her parents. 
When a minor under the age of sixteen is seeking or refusing treatment against the 










.  what correlation is there between age and competence?
Despite the focus on ‘maturity and understanding’ rather than fixed ages in 
UNCROC, Gillick,	 the Code and the professional guidelines on genetic testing of 
minors (discussed later), competence is not entirely unrelated to age.174 
Increasingly, research is revealing that minors have greater levels of understanding 
and sophistication at younger ages than previously thought. A study of postoperative 
pain in children under five years of age found that 75 per cent of the children could 
understand the concept of localising their pain, although only 41 per cent of staff 
thought that young children could do this.175 
Research has also indicated that from around the age of eleven minors understand: 
that bad health can be aggravated by psychological factors; the idea of drug related side 
effects; and the prospect of delay before responding to a treatment or procedure.176
Weithorn undertook major empirical research into the competence of children and 
adolescents to make informed treatment decisions.177 She interviewed ninety-six 
respondents, twenty-four (twelve males and twelve females) at each of four age levels: 
8.5 to 9.5 years; fourteen years; eighteen years; and twenty-one years. The respondents 
were asked to consider which of the proposed treatment alternatives they might 
select if they were faced with the four hypothetical treatment dilemmas outlined 
(relating to diabetes, epilepsy, depression and enuresis). Their responses were judged 
according to evidence of choice;178 reasonable outcome;179 rational reasons;180 and 
understanding (measured by rote recall to assess factual understanding and inference 
to assess appreciation). 181 
There were no statistically significant differences observed for sex. 
In	 general,	 minors	 aged	 14	 were	 found	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 level	 of	 competency	
equivalent	to	that	of	adults	…	Younger	minors	aged	9,	however,	appeared	less	




basics	 of	 what	 is	 required	 of	 them	 when	 they	 are	 asked	 to	 state	 a	 preference	
regarding	a	treatment	dilemma.	And,	despite	poorer	understanding	and	failure	
to	consider	 fully	many	of	 the	critical	elements	of	disclosed	 information,	 the	9-
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year-olds	 tended	 to	 express	 clear	and	 sensible	 treatment	preferences	 similar	 to	
those	of	adults.182
In light of her findings Weithorn concluded that ‘the ages of 18 or 21 as the “cutoffs” 
below which individuals are presumed to be incompetent to make determinations 
about their own welfare do not reflect the psychological capacities of most 
adolescents’.183 Her findings indicate that the New Zealand statutory ‘cutoff ’ of 
sixteen (section 36(1), COCA 2004) also does not reflect the psychological capacities 
of most minors. 
.7  what are the criteria for judging competence? 
Much has been written on assessing the competence of minors, since the Gillick	
judgment. The following statement from Lord Scarman appears to best encapsulate 
what is meant by reference to the Gillick	principle or Gillick	competency (in New 
Zealand at least):184 
a	 minor	 under	 the	 age	 of	 sixteen	 can	 give	 legally	 effective	 consent	 to	 medical	
treatment	 if	he	or	 she	has	 ‘sufficient	understanding	and	 intelligence	 to	 enable	
him	or	her	to	understand	fully	what	is	proposed’	(p	423).	
The MOH produced helpful advice for health practitioners in a document entitled 
Consent	in	Child	and	Youth	Health	in 1999, which interpreted competence or capacity 
as: ‘the ability or capability to make a rational, informed choice about accepting or 
refusing the treatment or service being offered, or authorising the collection and use 
of information’.185
Note that the guidance refers to competence as the ‘ability	 or	 capacity to make a 
rational, informed choice’ and does not require that the choice made be in fact a 
rational choice.186 In assessing whether a minor has such ability or capability, the 
MOH advised that, regardless of age, an individual must be able to understand: 
• that they have a choice (freedom from coercion)
• why they are being offered the ‘treatment’
• what is involved in what they are being offered
• what the probable benefits, risks, side effects, failure rates and alternatives are.187
The MOH further advised that competence ‘must be considered on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account not only the age of the child, but their functional maturity, 
the complexity of the information being given, the seriousness of their medical 
condition and the implications for the child of treatment and non-treatment’.188 
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The NZPS Working Party Report recommended that: 
An	autonomous	individual	must	be	able	to	conceive	and	choose	between	possible	
futures	for	themselves,	in	the	light	of	their	own	needs,	desires	and	values.	The	qualities	
which	are	necessary	 for	 this	 include:	 the	 capacities	 to	 envisage	and	comprehend	




In the New Zealand case of Re	S	Barker, J implied that competence was related to 
appreciating the significance of the relevant treatment.191 It is generally accepted that 
different degrees of competence are required in respect of different types of treatment, 
particularly with regard to the risks or possible consequences of treatment.192 This 
issue is particularly salient in the context of genetic testing.
The significance of the nature of the procedure or treatment under discussion to 
assessing competence was recognised by the Law Lords in Gillick:
It	 seems	 to	be	me	verging	on	 the	absurd	 to	 suggest	 that	a	 girl	 or	boy	aged	15	
could	not	effectively	consent,	for	example,	to	have	a	medical	examination	of	some	
trivial	injury	to	his	body	or	even	to	have	a	broken	arm	set	…	Provided	the	patient	







and	 understanding	 of	 the	 infant.	 For	 example,	 a	 doctor	 with	 the	 consent	 of	
an	 intelligent	boy	or	girl	of	15	could	 in	my	opinion	 safely	 remove	 tonsils	or	a	
troublesome	appendix	(per	Lord	Templeman	at	432).	
For example, it has been argued that a nine-year-old could consent to being treated 
for a ‘sore throat, an ingrown toenail or an ear infection’ but it would be unlikely 
that he could competently consent to a tonsillectomy.193 A health professional might 
respect the refusal of a ten or twelve-year-old child to consent to the removal of non-
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dangerous mole (partly because of the difficulty inherent in removing a mole from 
an unwilling patient).194 
The nature of the procedure or treatment is also relevant to the presumption of 





Acknowledging that different levels of competence may be required for different 
procedures or treatments does not mean that different levels of competence may 
be required in respect of consent or refusal of consent for the same	procedure. A 
minor does not have to be more competent to consent to a procedure or treatment, 
than to refuse consent to the same procedure or treatment, or vice versa. Part of the 
consent process requires an understanding of the consequences of not consenting 
to the proposed procedure or treatment: that is, understanding what the effect of a 
refusal would mean. 
In summary, the general features involved in assessing competence relate to whether 
a minor understands: the purpose of a treatment or procedure; the nature of the 
treatment or procedure; and the possible	consequences (including the short and long-
term risks, benefits and harms) involved in having or not having the treatment or 
procedure. The minor must be able to make an informed choice between options, 
arguably, in light of what is (or will be) important to him or her. 
.  concerns with criteria for competence







A major concern with the criteria for assessing competence in minors, is that minors 
are often judged at a far higher standard than those set for adults. For example, both 
Weithorn198 and Redding199 consider ‘reasonable outcome’ or ‘reasonable choice’ 
integral criteria for measuring or demonstrating competence. The objective wisdom 
of a decision may affect whether or not a minor is deemed competent, whereas 
adults can make any unwise choices that they wish, and generally have those choices 





whether	 the	 child	 is	making	a	wise	decision,	 rather	 than	on	 the	 child’s	actual	
capacity	to	understand	(and	intelligence).200	
The NZPS Working Party Report cautioned that: 
Rejection	of	professionally	recommended	treatment	by	a	child	under	16	should	
not	 automatically	 be	 taken	 as	 evidence	 of	 lack	 of	 competence	 to	 decide	 their	
own	health-care.	The	more	serious	the	consequences	of	rejecting	the	treatment,	
the	 greater	 care	must	be	 taken	 in	ascertaining	 the	 level	 of	understanding	and	
decision-making	competence	of	the	child.201
However, it has been argued202 (and also seen in the United Kingdom cases of Re	M, 
Re	R, and Re	W and the Laufau case in New Zealand)203 that a minor is more likely to 
be judged incompetent in situations in which his or her decision to consent to or to 
refuse to consent to a medical procedure or treatment is life-threatening.
In the United Kingdom case of Re	M,204 involving a fifteen-year-old girl who was 







Kathryn McLean refers to the House of Lords judgment in Airedale	 NHS	 Trust	 v	
Bland206 to argue that a competent individual’s decision should be respected no 






There is a concern that doctors assessing competence will be swayed by their 
professional biases and proclivity towards acting in a patient’s best interest, and may 
judge minors competent when they agree to a doctor’s proposed treatment, and 




to	 protect	 the	 vulnerable	 with	 out	 overarching	 concern	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	
individual	self-determination.209	
With reference to Lord Scarman’s comment in particular that ‘moral and family 
questions’210 must be understood by a competent minor, Bainham has argued that: 
‘it is not obvious that the medical profession should be allowed to pass judgment on 
non-medical matters such as moral and family issues. …’.211 We agree that a medical 
professional’s subjective judgment of the morality of a minor’s decision and of how 
her decision may affect her family members should not be a factor in assessing 
her competence. Note also however, that Lord Scarman’s references to ‘moral and 
family questions’ were made explicitly in the specific context of a minor seeking 
contraceptive advice or treatment, and did not appear to relate to requirements for 
competence in other medical areas. 
The perceived wisdom of a minor’s decision should not be a part of the criteria for 
assessing her competence. It is more important that the minor has the ability to make 
rational decisions and work through the decision-making process rationally. Rational 
adults can disagree on all manner of issues, including whether or not to proceed with 
a certain medical procedure. For example, 5–20 per cent of adults at risk for the HD 
mutation elect to undergo predictive testing.212 Many others elect not to undergo 
such testing. Neither group of individuals is necessarily irrational because they came 
to different decisions: the individuals presumably have different perceptions about 
the impact the genetic information will have on their lives. 
Relying predominantly on the perceived wisdom of a decision in assessing 
competence could also be very misleading: Weithorn’s research showed that nine-
year-olds can reach the same medical decisions as twenty-one-year-olds,213 but they 
do not necessarily arrive at those decisions via the same rational decision-making 
processes. It is the ability to comprehend and reason through the alternatives and 
the risks which is of tantamount importance. The perceived wisdom of the decision 
is overrated as a tool for assessing competence. In Gillick	 Lord Scarman and his 
colleagues focused on the ability to understand and the understanding of the minor 
making the decision, and not the outcome of the decision. 
However, it may be appropriate, when engaged in the difficult task of assessing 
competence, to ask the minor for her reasons for making the decision that she has 
made. Otherwise, there is a danger that minors may reach decisions or conclusions 
based upon false premises. (Note that checking the consumer’s understanding of 
the issues and reasons for making the decision could be equally beneficial for many 
adults). Asking for the minor’s reasons may yield information about the subjective 
wisdom of the decision for the minor, and affirm that she has made an informed 
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choice between options in light of what is, or what she perceives will be, important 
to her.214 In this manner, a health professional may be more assured that the minor 
understands the implications of the decision for her life and her future. This is the 
maximum extent to which the rationality of the minor’s decision should be judged 
– the extent to which the decision is congruous with her stated goals and life plans. 
A choice that points clearly in the opposite direction of that which the minor has 
indicated that she values, or which will not assist her to attain her goals, may indicate 
a lacuna in her understanding or her reasoning processes. 
The issue of protecting a minor from making a medical decision that will put her life 
at risk may not often arise in the context of genetic testing. The decision to undergo 
predictive or carrier testing will generally not be a life-threatening decision.215 The 
decision to refuse predictive testing or carrier testing will similarly generally not be 
personally life-threatening, and in any case, it is a reversible decision.216 Of course 
when any person is seeking or refusing treatment or a procedure that may have 
serious medical or psychosocial consequences, they must be carefully counselled as 
to their options and the risks and implications of each. Taking care to ensure that they 
completely understand the alternatives and risks will form part of the competence 
assessment for minors. 
Competence	is	a	relative	not	an	absolute	quality,	and	higher	standards	should	
not	be	expected	from	children	than	from	adults	…217
  Does genetic testing raise DiFFerent issues in terms oF  
 comPetence to give inFormeD consent?
There is a great deal of evidence as well as academic and professional support for the 
idea that minors have sufficient intellectual or cognitive abilities to make medical 
decisions by their early teens.218 However, whether they have the social and emotional 
maturity to make genetic testing decisions is more controversial. 
A recent study put together by the Australian Institute of Family Studies219 indicated 
that adolescents (between fifteen and eighteen years of age) had quite definite and 
rational ideas about what was or would be important to them both now and in the 
future. While many of the minors prioritised keeping fit, getting more education, 
having lots of friends, and sports and hobbies, they also believed that when they 
were thirty-five years of age they would attach more importance to issues such as a 
career, saving and investing, making a lot of money and relationships and children. 
The study indicates that whilst adolescents are (quite naturally) not concerned about 
adult issues in terms of their current existence, they have the foresight to recognise 
what issues will be important to them as they age. This suggests that minors faced 
with a decision about whether or not to have a pre-symptomatic genetic test may 
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have a greater understanding of the future implications than they are usually given 
credit for: this is particularly so given that these adolescents will generally come from 
families in which there is experience of a heritable genetic disorder and its impacts 
(see discussion on ‘Experience of illness’ later).
A study of young people in HD families found that ‘there is no evidence to support the 
supposition that young people are too emotionally volatile to cope with information 
about HC’.220 
.  arguments in favour of a higher standard of competence for genetic testing  
 decisions
Binedell et al. argue that ‘the capacity for adolescent competence in decision making 
is apparent but whether or not adolescents exploit this capacity is constrained or 
facilitated by a number of factors’.221 Adolescence is a period of transition in which 
minors are exploring and developing their identities, separately from their parents. 
‘It is a time of experimentation with new roles and fluctuation of values.’222 Some 
consider that adolescents fail to weight the future appropriately and that their values 
are subject to change over time (more so than adults).223 Additionally, peer pressure 
threatens autonomous decision-making and has been found to be strongest before 
the age of fifteen years.224 
A change in values is certainly something that can occur amongst both minors 
and adults, and this is not necessarily an evil as people develop and grow in their 
understanding of various issues. It is possible that some adults may in the future wish 
that they had not undergone predictive genetic testing. This is not a reason to deny 
them access to testing: it is an impetus for careful consideration of the implications 
and likely consequences of genetic testing. Likewise for minors. 
In terms of concerns about peer pressure, a minor may be more likely to feel pressured 
(whether overtly or otherwise) to refuse to undergo genetic testing, rather than to be 
tested and risk discovering that one is affected by a genetic mutation. Additionally, 
seeking or deferring to parental opinions when decision-making is not necessarily 
problematic in the genetic testing context. Indeed, it is natural for people to seek and 
be influenced by the views of others when deciding on a course of action: ‘…studies 
of adults might equally well show that they did what they thought their spouses or 
children would want’.225 
Notwithstanding, few of the concerns have any impact on the legal test for competence. 
In particular, concerns relating to peer pressure or undue deference to parental wishes 
go more to the ‘voluntariness’ requirement for the giving of informed consent, rather 
than the competence criteria. 
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Richards argues that assessing the cognitive or intellectual competence of minors 
is insufficient in respect of genetic testing decisions, which have such potentially 
far-reaching implications. She claims that ‘a far more comprehensive definition 
of maturity, linked to age and developmental age, is required for assessing young 
people at risk who request predictive testing’.226 Richards suggests that ‘maturity 
of judgement in decision-making’ is the most important factor in assessing 
competence to give informed consent to predictive testing. She advocates Steinberg 
and Cauffman’s model for assessing maturity of judgment, which identifies three 
aspects of psychosocial maturity: responsibility, which involves self-reliance, clarity 
of identity, and independence; temperance, the ability to limit impulsive behaviour 
and avoid extremes in decision-making; and perspective, which involves the ability 
to appreciate the complexity of situations and the long-terms consequences of 
decisions.227
However, Richards believes that it is important to strictly adhere to a minimum age 
of eighteen years for predictive genetic testing for untreatable late-onset disorders, 
for the following reasons: to provide a consistent structure for professionals dealing 
with requests for testing of minors of varying ages; to reduce dependence on 
arbitrary judgments of clinicians who may vary in their ability to make assessments 
of maturity; and because there was evidence that it was not developmentally possible 
for adolescents of fifteen and sixteen years of age to have attained sufficient maturity 
of judgment regardless of their life experience.228 
Richards’ first two points (in the preceding paragraph) are not substantive matters: 
they are procedural matters. It would certainly be easier for clinicians to have a 
simple age criteria for dealing with requests for testing from minors. However, 
such an approach does not reflect the law in New Zealand, gives no credence to the 
Gillick	principle or UNCROC, and does not serve the health needs of minors. The 
third reason Richards offers for adhering to a strict age-based test is premised on 
the principle of universality. All minors do not develop uniformly and at the same 
time. In the context of genetic testing, it is precisely because of their unique life 
experiences, and current as well as future experiences, that some minors would seek 
genetic testing. It is not suggested that genetic testing be made available to all minors, 
but that it be provided to competent minors who request testing (after genetic 
counselling). Consistency is not a reason to support an inflexible approach to minors 
and medical decision-making. 
Adhering to a strict age limit of eighteen years exchanges the potentially arbitrary 
judgments of clinicians who may vary in their ability to assess competence, to the 
equally, if not more, arbitrary judgment of a group of policymakers who have 
never met the minor who is requesting testing and know nothing of her individual 
circumstances.
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Additionally, many adults may not be sufficiently competent to meet the criteria 
posited by the ‘maturity of judgement in decision-making’. Indeed, Richards herself 
acknowledged that ‘I have counselled eighteen-year-olds who have not achieved 
sufficient maturity’ to make a decision about predictive testing for HD.229 
Clarke has argued that another factor important to assess when considering requests 
for genetic testing from adolescents is ‘why the request for testing has come now 
rather than in a few years, and why a test should be performed now, at this time 
rather than another’.230 Similarly, Geller argues in response to a hypothetical case 
concerning a fifteen-year-old girl (Alison) requesting HD predictive testing:
The	issue	is	not	whether	to	test	the	Alisons	of	the	world	at	all,	 it	 is	whether	to	




up	 for	 the	extensive	counselling	and	assessment	 that	 is	being	recommended	to	
assess	the	competence	of	adolescents	who	might	request	such	testing.231
Whether a test can safely be performed later, when the minor reaches the age of 
majority, is not a factor to be considered in assessing whether a minor is competent 
to make the decision. The fact that a test could be performed later does not make the 
minor any less competent to choose to undergo testing now. However, the option of 
deferring testing can be discussed with the minor, particularly so that the minor is 
entirely clear that there will be minimal or no clinical harm from waiting. Resourcing 
issues are beyond the scope of this section of the report. 
Related, refusing to test minors on the basis that they do not intend to make 
reproductive decisions in the near future, would be inconsistent with the grounds 
upon which adults are tested: many adults are tested for HD who have completed 
their families, and are seeking the information for other reasons.232 
There may be compelling ethical and practical justifications not to defer testing until 
the age of majority: many minors are living with knowledge that they at risk, some live 
as if they definitely have inherited a mutation, some engage in risk-taking behaviours, 
and others feel like they are ‘holding their breath’ until they can be tested. Deferring 
testing on the basis of age has the potential to harm and demean competent minors. 
The need to respect the autonomy and decision-making rights of competent persons 
is also a compelling justification for not deferring testing on the basis of age alone. 
It is paternalistic and discriminatory to select a group of competent, autonomous 
individuals and deny them access to genetic testing.
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Duncan refers to the concern of the United Kingdom CGS Working Party that 
because a decision to test a minor was irreversible, professionals might be considered 
liable in the future if an adult claims that she never should have been tested as a 
child: ‘there are good legal reasons for professionals to make decisions in this area 
primarily on the basis of the long term best interests of the child; failure to do so 
could lead to professionals later being sued’.233 Regardless of the likelihood (or not) of 
any such claim succeeding, advocating that minors who appear competent in every 
way be refused genetic testing because of a fear of professional liability, swings the 
pendulum too far in favour of the practice of defensive medicine. While minors may 
be encouraged to take extra time to make a decision about genetic testing, this should 
only be encouragement, not coercion, and not a method of avoiding testing a minor 
for self-interested professional reasons. 
Wertz et al. have argued that there are four requirements to competence to consent 







They argue that there may be difficulty in assessing whether a minor’s request for or 
consent to testing is voluntary. However, the voluntariness of consent goes to whether 
the informed consent is valid, not to whether the person is competent to make the 
decision. Competent people can be pressured into making certain decisions: such does 
not make them incompetent, although it may make the consent given ineffective.
Caulfield suggests that these criteria for competence ‘could be considered an extreme 
position’. He argues that such criteria have no basis in law (in Canada at least), 
and that relying on them could result in a very paternalistic approach to assessing 
competence. For example, what is a ‘reasonable outcome’ and what are ‘sound reasons 
for the choice?’ Caulfield argues that the legal test for competence is not as onerous as 
ethical tests appear to be.235
The debate about whether minors can be competent to give informed consent to 
genetic testing often gets mired in the appropriate criteria for assessing competence, 
and whether it is possible for minors to meet the stipulated criteria. Much of the 
debate in the literature pertaining specifically to minors and genetic testing decisions 
focuses on what might be regarded as ethical criteria for competence. However, 
the question of whether minors are competent to give informed consent to genetic 
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testing is a question of facts, which are to be measured against legal criteria, not 
ethical criteria. 
Competence is important as a necessary competent of informed consent, which 
is only legally effective when it is voluntary, informed, and given by a competent 
person.236 Health professionals can generally not lawfully administer medical 
procedures or treatment to a person without the informed consent of the competent 
person authorised to give consent (whether that be the person themselves or their 
legal representative or guardian if they are not considered competent).237 The criteria 
for judging competence are legal criteria. 
Criteria for assessing competence are not laid out in any legislation in New Zealand. 
The major common law authority on the competence of minors to consent to make 
their own medical decisions is Gillick.	The following statement from Lord Scarman 
appears to best encapsulate what is meant by reference to Gillick	competency (in New 
Zealand at least):238 
a	 minor	 under	 the	 age	 of	 sixteen	 can	 give	 legally	 effective	 consent	 to	 medical	
treatment	 if	he	or	 she	has	 ‘sufficient	understanding	and	 intelligence	 to	 enable	
him	or	her	to	understand	fully	what	is	proposed’	(p	423).	
The criteria are general and very broad and have been applied to mean that 
minors under the age of sixteen must understand the purpose, the nature, and the 
consequences and implications of the decision in question in order to be competent 
to give legally effective informed consent (or refusal of consent). 
Arguably, health professionals may also consider whether the minor’s choice accords 
with her stated goals or aspirations post-testing. A choice that points clearly in the 
opposite direction of that which the minor has indicated that she values, or which 
will not assist her to attain her goals, may indicate a hole in her understanding or her 
reasoning processes. Thus a ‘set of values’ may be included within the more general 
legal requirements of competence, so long as the criterion is restricted to having a 
conception of the good life for oneself, and assessment of whether the choice evinced 
is commensurate with that conception – if it is then it would appear that the minor 
understands the implications of testing. The question is not whether the minor’s 
conception of the good life, or goals or aspirations, is appropriate or not.
An	autonomous	individual	has	every	right	to	make	what	most	would	consider	a	
‘bad’	decision.239
As Binedell et al. argue: ‘the focus of the assessment should be on the decision making 
process rather than on the final decision made, there being no “right” decision in 
this case’.240 
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Competent minors should not have their access to genetic testing restricted on a 
different basis from any restrictions that might apply to adults; that is, all persons 
who are competent, on the formulation articulated in the preceding paragraphs, 
should be treated equally in respect of requests for genetic testing.241 Minors should 
not be required to jump through hoops to meet criteria for competence that many 
adults may not be able to meet, and that the minors themselves may never be able to 
meet, even as adults.
.2  experience of illness
It is a contentious issue whether minors at risk for heritable genetic disorders are 




We have seen that minors are able to understand information about heritable genetic 
risks: ‘We simply cannot assume that children are not capable of understanding genetic 
knowledge or that they are better off not being told when they have experienced the 
consequences of genetic conditions within their families’.243
Alderson argues





Richards suggests that some minors will be pseudo mature, their behaviour 
mimicking that of adults (given the roles that they may have had to adopt) ‘without 
being accompanied by the perceptions, beliefs or understanding of a psychologically 
mature adult’.245 Similarly, Wertz et al. caution that ‘well-informed, articulate children 
or adolescents are not necessarily coping well with the prospect of illness’.246 However, 
many adults do not cope well with the prospect of illness: minors should be judged 
upon the same standards. Rather than a minor’s request for testing simply being 
dismissed because of a perceived lack of coping skills, coping mechanisms need to 
be carefully considered in genetic counselling. The discussion in the second section 
of this report on ‘Benefits and harms’ provides some evidence to suggest that some 
minors cope reasonably well with genetic test results. 
Research into the psychological and genetic counselling implications for daughters 
(between eleven and nineteen years) of mothers with breast cancer247 indicated 
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that there were no significant differences between the daughters of mothers with 
breast cancer and those from families with no major health issues, on measures of 
emotional, behavioural, social and familial functioning (self-reported by daughters 
and mothers). All daughters were well within the normal range of functioning.248 
Daughters of mothers with breast cancer were naturally significantly more concerned 
with their perceived risk of inheriting a BRCA mutation and developing breast 
cancer. A large minority (40 per cent) said that their worries about breast cancer 
somewhat or ‘to a fair bit’ affected the way they felt from day to day. However, 60 per 
cent indicated that worries about breast cancer did not at all affect the way they felt 
from day to day.249 
Minors seeking testing for a heritable genetic mutation may generally be more 
contextually competent than minors consenting to other medical procedures: most of 
them will have some experience of the relevant genetic condition, given their family 
history which places them at risk. Even amongst those who do not have personal 
experience, they may still be as competent to make a decision about testing as an 
adult who similarly has no personal experience of the relevant condition.
How a minor has reacted and adapted to the information and experience of the 
genetic mutation in the family may be a useful predictor of how the minor might 




A minor might have extensive experience of a disorder within her family but if all 
of that experience is secretive, negative, and terrifying, then it may not enhance her 
competence to make a decision about whether to be tested. Whereas, if she has been 
raised in an open and honest, supportive and nurturing environment then, as result, 
she might very well be more competent to make a decision about testing. The need for 
a careful individual assessment of each minor who requests genetic testing is clear.
 
.  arguments relying upon arguably outdated views of minors 
Psychological	testing	tends	to	be	biased	by	outdated	developmental	theories	which	
under-estimate	children’s	abilities.252
In the discourse surrounding genetic testing of minors, commentators frequently 
adhere to arbitrary ages when referring to theories of child development or 
categorising minors’ cognitive abilities or developmental steps. 
Binedell et al. argue that competence needs to be defined and indeed only has 
meaning with reference to the social, cultural, and institutional context. On this 
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analysis the degree of a person’s competence is affected by external factors, such as 
parental attitudes and expectations, and the state of medicine, the law, and media. All 
of these external factors are instrumental in determining notions of minors’ abilities, 
rights and responsibilities. Prevailing conceptions of children and adolescents have 
an impact on the way that competence is developed and assessed.253 
For	example,	children’s	competence	would	be	enhanced	where	parents	see	them	
as	responsible	and	trustworthy,	informing	them	and	involving	them	in	decision	
making.	 Conversely,	 competence	 would	 be	 inhibited	 where	 parents	 adopt	 a	
controlling	or	protective	stance	toward	their	children,	withholding	information	
from	 them.	 Features	 of	 the	 clinical	 setting	 in	 which	 testing	 takes	 place	 could	
hinder	adolescents’	capacity	to	make	competent	decisions	by,	for	example,	a	lack	
of	space	to	sit	and	talk	quietly.254	
The world and the minors within it are experiencing a period of rapid change. 
Globalisation and the internet have resulted in an unprecedented dissemination of 
every conceivable kind of information throughout the world. Minors who know 
that they are at risk for a heritable genetic disorder may know about advances in 
knowledge about their condition. They may very well have done their own research 
into the disorder on the Internet. ‘These discoveries are reported everywhere, not 
only in medical journals, but in the lay press as well.’255
Studies have shown that a large number of patients and parents of paediatric patients 
use the internet to find out health information. Younger people are more likely to 
be familiar with the use of computers and the internet: ‘other studies reporting a 
high rate of internet use for medical information site [sic] younger age as a factor 
significantly associated with such use of the internet’.256
Regardless, it is important that health professionals assess the minor’s competence 
as an individual and not on a generic concept of what minors are presumed to 
understand or not understand.
…	the	courts	have	recognised	that,	where	possible,	irreversible	decisions	should	be	
left	for	children	to	make	when	they	reach	maturity.257		
If it is thought that different levels of competence may be required for consenting 
than for refusing consent to treatment (which we have indicated above that we do 
not accept) then it is arguable that refusing	consent to genetic testing requires a lower	
standard of competence than consenting. Consenting to genetic testing is irreversible 
and may have more serious consequences than refusing to give consent to testing. In 
contrast to some other medical procedures or treatments, it might be argued that a 
lower standard of competence is required to refuse consent to genetic testing, than 
the competence required to consent. Consenting to genetic testing can have greater 
implications that need to be explored and understood.
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Even when testing is not clinically indicated, there can be serious implications to 
rejecting genetic testing too, not least of which relate to reproductive decisions. For 
example a minor at 50 per cent risk of carrying an untreatable autosomal dominant 
genetic mutation has a 25 per cent risk of passing the mutation onto any child she 
bears. However, a refusal to be tested can be reversed, whereas consent to testing 
cannot, and thus the implications are arguably more serious, and some may consider 
that the degree of competence required is higher. We reiterate that we consider the 
same standard of competence is required to give informed consent or refusal of 
consent to any	medical decision. 
.  Professional position statements and assessing competence 
The Human Genetics Society of Australasia policy on Predictive	Testing	in	Children	
and	Adolescents	(2005)258 offers the following guidance to practitioners in assessing 
the competency of a minor to consent to a predictive genetic test: 
• There must be full discussion with the child about the testing, risks and 
implications.
• Discussion between parents and child is to be encouraged.
• The child must demonstrate an understating of the nature of the test, risks, 
benefits and implications.
• Psychological testing may be important to assess the psychological state of the 
child.
• A second professional opinion may be appropriate.
The HGSA policy also recommends that consultation with medical geneticists, 
genetic counsellors and psychologists could be considered to assess the child’s level 
of competence. This guidance to professionals in terms of what kinds of things are 
relevant when assessing competency is very similar to the general assessment of 
competence seen above. Thus, the policy does not suggest a novel approach, and nor 
does it appear to infer that a higher level of competence is required than that in a 
more general clinical setting. 
The Canadian Paediatric Society Guidelines	for	genetic	testing	of	healthy	children	state	
that children as young as four can understand ideas of inheritance. Seven year olds 
have generally begun to develop ‘concrete concepts of health-related procedures … 
correlating with the acceptance of “assent” ...’259 The Guidelines contend that full 
understanding of the nature and consequences of agreeing to or refusing medical 
management does not occur until early adolescence, or even later. The capacity to 
understand abstract ideas of social risk, including loss of privacy, social stigmatisation 
and potential insurance or employment discrimination may require even greater 
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insight. The Guidelines also note that many adults have difficulty understanding 
probability and risk in terms of genetic test results.260 
The American Society of Human Genetics and American College of Medical Genetics 
Report ‘Points to Consider, Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial Implications of Genetic 
testing in Children and Adolescents’ (1995) states that minors can begin to participate 
in decisions by the age of seven because they have sufficient cognitive and language 
skills to understand some information. Therefore, in the United States seven-year-
olds are entitled to give ‘assent’ to participation in research.261 
Decisions	about	competence	should	not	depend	arbitrarily	on	the	child’s	age	but	
should	be	based	on	an	evaluation	of	the	child’s	cognitive	and	moral	development.	
The	 provider	 should	 also	 attempt	 to	 establish	 that	 the	 child’s	 decision	 is	
voluntary.262
The report explains that competence in decision-making depends on the possession 
of three broad capacities: understanding and communication; reasoning and 
deliberation; and development and sustenance of a set of moral values.263
The report acknowledges that minors might have a genuine interest in career or child 
bearing choice, despite their still being vulnerable to coercion, stigmatisation and 
altered self-image. The report charges that by the age of twelve or fourteen some 
minors will have sufficient decision-making capacity to evaluate specific risks and 
benefits of tests and treatments.264 According to this report, genetic testing decisions 
do not seem to require a higher degree of competence than other medical decisions. 
The assessment criteria outlined are similar to those discussed in the more general 
section on competence. 
Likewise, one cannot infer from the United Kingdom CGS Working Party Report 
that a higher standard of competence is required to consent to genetic testing. The 
report simply refers to Gillick	and the fact that some minors under the statutory age 
of consent may be competent to give informed consent to medical procedures.265 
.  how is competence to be assessed in practice?
4.5.1  Who should assess a minor’s competence?
The MOH cautions that ‘while the views of the parent or carer as to the child’s 
competence may be taken into account, it is the practitioner’s responsibility to form 
an independent judgement on the matter’.266 This will of course be necessary where 
the minor seeks treatment alone, or against the wishes of her parents. But it will also 
be important when the child appears to be in agreement with her parents. 
While there is a presumption of competence within the Code:
In	 practice,	 no	 health	 practitioner	 actually	 presumes	 a	 5	 year	 old	 competent	
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till	 [sic]	 proven	 otherwise.	 Reality	 and	 practicality	 work	 from	 a	 presumption	





It has been noted that doctors generally receive little training in assessing the cognitive 
development of children
and	 may	 be	 quite	 ignorant	 of	 personal	 circumstances	 (which	 include	 aspects	
relating	 to	 the	 child’s	 familial	 relationships)	 affecting	 a	 child’s	 maturity	 and	
understanding	of	the	procedure	involved.	These	concerns	are	more	significant	if	
the	doctor’s	consultation	time	is	limited,	as	is	often	the	case.268	
Kathryn McLean has also criticised the appropriateness of health professionals 
assessing competence, saying that ‘they will be swayed by their professional biases’, 





She accepts, however, that health professionals must be responsible for assessing the 
competence of minors, citing as relevant factors: they are experienced at assessing 
competence; there may be no other group more appropriate to make such assessments; 
and health professionals are the ones who will be administering or refusing treatment 
and ‘therefore it must be the doctor who is satisfied that he or she is justified in 
doing so’.271 
Family doctors may be at an advantage in assessing the competence of a minor, if they 
have prior knowledge of the minor’s abilities, maturity and family background.272 
Clinical geneticists and genetic counsellors may also build up relationships with 
families ‘as they have their children and as the extended family come in to discuss 
how a condition might affect them’.273
Genetic counselling is currently standard practice before predictive, susceptibility 
and even carrier testing for certain serious late-onset disorders will be undertaken 
(e.g. HD, adrenoleucodystrophy and tests for a BRCA mutation or other hereditary 







Genetic counsellors are trained not only in genetics, but also in interviewing and 
counselling.275 Genetic counselling, undertaken in the manner recommended by 
the HGSA, could provide a very suitable forum within which a minor’s competence 
to give informed consent to genetic testing may be assessed. The HGSA further 
recommends that: 
A	test	should	only	be	performed	on	an	individual	who	has	made	an	informed	





basis,	 pattern	 of	 inheritance,	 and	 availability	 of	 prevention,	 surveillance	 and	
treatment	strategies.	Details	of	the	test	and	the	testing	process	should	be	explained.	
Reproductive	 options	 should	 be	 discussed,	 if	 relevant.	 Information	 should	 be	
provided	about	lay	organisations	and	genetic	registers	that	exist	to	inform	and	




The genetic counsellor must go through a careful information giving and checking 
process to ensure that everyone seeking genetic testing understands the implications. 
She must ensure the voluntariness of any consent given. Voluntariness is a vital 
component of informed consent, and particularly so: in the genetics context where 
the medical decision will have information implications for other family members; 
and for minors who may be particularly susceptible to family pressure for testing. 
Reproductive issues also need to be canvassed for minors who may intend to have 
children themselves in the future. Ultimately, a primary task of the genetic counsellor 
is to explain fully the testing process and its implications for the particular disorder 
in question; to confirm understanding of the information imparted; and to support 
the decision-maker. This role seems well suited to incorporating assessing requests 
for genetic testing from minors. 
Another recommendation contained in the HGSA policy may further reassure the 
genetic counsellor, and perhaps even the minor and/or family, that the minor is not 





Where, during or after genetic counselling, doubt remains as to a minor’s competence 
to consent to genetic testing, and predictive testing in particular, it may be advisable 
to involve a child psychologist or psychiatrist.277 Psychological and psychiatric 
assessment of persons undergoing HD predictive testing has not been for the 
purposes of gate keeping (except to the extent that people with serious psychiatric 
illnesses or suicidal tendencies may be excluded); it has been for the purposes of 
identifying factors predictive of coping responses and enhancing the planning 
of appropriate support after the decision is made.278 Psychological or psychiatric 
assessment of minors presenting for predictive	genetic testing could therefore serve 
the dual function of providing somewhat of a gate-keeping role in terms of assessing 
competence to make the decision, but simultaneously could identify predictors of 
post-decision reactions and needs.
4.5.2  How is competency to be assessed?
Health professionals may assess the competence of the minor by explaining the 
purpose, nature and potential consequences of the treatment in a manner and in 
language that the minor can understand. The health professional may question the 
minor to clarify the extent of his or her understanding and competence in respect of 
the decision to be made.
From	their	first	 interaction	with	a	patient,	doctors	will	have	begun	to	assess	a	
patient’s	competence	and	abilities;	the	process	of	assessment	will	be	an	on-going	



























4.5.3  Assessing competency to give informed consent to genetic testing in particular 
Wertz, Fanos and Reilly suggest that new measures are needed to enable professionals 
to evaluate a minor’s competence, perhaps through open-ended questions about 
the future or responses to vignettes describing future life problems, and careful 
interviewing.281 
New measures for assessing competence in the context of genetic testing may be 
appropriate or helpful, but the same standard of competence is required. Minors should 
not be expected to know more than they are expected to know of other procedures, 
and they should not be expected to have greater understanding than adults. 
Binedell offers some guidance for the kind of information professionals should look 
for when assessing competence to give informed consent to genetic testing. Her 
guidance is in respect of HD specifically, but the principles are more universal. Her 
model for assessment has been widely endorsed.282 The information to be sought 
has some commonality with Larcher’s recommendations in respect of assessing 
competence to consent to medical procedures generally: 
The following information may be useful in the assessment process:
































Binedell further suggests that in the absence of standardised tools for assessing 
competence in the clinical genetics context, minors should be referred to professionals 
with expertise in the area such as clinical psychologists and psychiatrists (and also 
suggests that this occurs within a research protocol). However, we think that if 
genetic counselling is undertaken with due care and deference to the guidance from 
the HGSA Policy on Presymptomatic	 and	 Predictive	 Testing	 for	 Genetic	 Disorders, 
genetic counsellors may have the information and tools required to assess a minor’s 
competence in the clinical genetic context. They have training and experience 
in interviewing and counselling with respect to genetic disorders, and could use 
Larcher and Binedell’s guidance in respect of assessing the understanding of minors, 
in particular. Additionally, the discussion of minors’ understanding of genetic 
information shows that the process of educating minors about genetic testing, and 
exploring and personalising the longer term implications of testing for them is a 
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useful method of conveying the information that they need to understand in order 
to give informed consent. 
Binedell notes that as is the case with at risk adults, many minors who seek testing 
will decide against it during the counselling process. These people may also require 
some psychological support to live with the continued uncertainty.284
.  comments
Genetic testing raises the same issues in terms of competence to give informed 
consent, as other medical procedures: consent must be given voluntarily, on an 
informed basis, by a competent person.
Genetic information may be more complex, and may contain more uncertainties or 
probabilities than other medical information. This provides a challenge for health 
professionals to fulfil their obligations under the Code and give consumers, including 
competent minors, the requisite information to enable them to give legally effective 
informed consent. The information must be given in such a way that minors can 
understand it. There is evidence that adequately educated and informed minors can 
understand the necessary genetic information to give informed consent to testing.
Some have argued that consenting to genetic testing requires a higher degree of 
competence than consent to other kinds of medical procedures, because of the ethical, 
psychological and social issues. However, the legal	criteria for assessing competence 
remain the same: the person must understand the purpose of the procedure, the 
nature of the procedure and the consequences and implications. It may be necessary 
to give minors more information about the longer-term implications of testing as 
they may not previously have had cause to consider such issues. They should not, 
however, be held to higher standards for decision-making than adults are held to. The 
wisdom or rationality of the actual decision is irrelevant to a competence assessment 
except to the extent that one may consider whether the decision accords with the 
minor’s self-professed goals and desired outcomes of the decision. It is not the role 
of the health professional to second-guess or judge the minor’s goals. However, he 
or she must ensure that the minor has made the decision based on all of the relevant 
information – an incongruity between the choice evinced and the stated goals or 
desired outcomes of the choice may indicate a lack of understanding or insufficient 
information upon which to make the decision. 
Many of the professional position statements from various countries offer guidance 
for assessing competence in the context of genetic testing that is similar to the more 
general approach to assessing competence: they do not appear to imply that there are 
different criteria for assessing competence in the context of genetic testing. 
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Genetic counselling is usually required before predictive or carrier testing for 
serious disorders will be undertaken, providing an ideal forum within which a 
minor’s competence can be assessed. Larcher’s model, coupled with Binedell’s useful 
questions for professionals to consider when exploring whether minors understand 
the purpose, nature and consequences and implications of genetic testing, provides 
an appropriate extra tool for assessing the competence of minors to give legally 
effective informed consent in the clinical genetics setting 
 
  conclusion
As outlined at the beginning of this section, self-referral for genetic testing by minors 
does occur, albeit rarely.285 The two major objections to permitting minors to consent 
to genetic testing are that: genetic testing is too harmful for minors; and genetic 
testing, and its implications, are so complex that minors could not be competent to 
give valid informed consent to testing.
There is no explicit regulation or policy relating to genetic testing of minors in New 
Zealand. In our view competent minors can consent and also refuse consent to all 
kinds of genetic testing, pursuant to section 36(1) of the Care of Children Act 2004 
(if they are of or over the age of sixteen). Gillick	 as applied in New Zealand, the 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 1996, the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
also support this view. 
Once a minor is deemed competent (statutorily, or in light of her maturity and 
understanding) then harms and benefits become largely irrelevant (except to the 
extent that any health professional can refuse to provide services that have no medical 
benefit), and competent minors’ requests for testing should be treated in the same 
manner as requests by adults. However, if the reference in section 36(1) of the COCA 
2004 to benefit is taken to mean that sixteen and seventeen-year-old minors can only 
consent to procedures that are intended to benefit them, they can still consent to 
genetic testing, whether or not treatment is available for the disorder for which they 
are seeking treatment, because there are benefits in knowing one’s future genetic 
health status.
At the time of writing there appears to be more convincing evidence for the benefits 
that arise from genetic testing (some of which are knowable a	 priori), than the 
purported harms, in respect of competent minors who request genetic testing.
There is a distinct paucity of evidence of actual harm arising from genetic testing 
of minors, and harms specifically related to competent minors are even more 
speculative. Additionally, some of the projected harms can already be seen in minors 
living ‘at risk’ for a heritable genetic mutation: harm can arise from not acceding to a 
competent minor’s request for genetic testing. 
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Thorough genetic counselling, and an individual	 assessment of the minor’s 
competence to consent is vital before a minor makes a decision about whether to 
undergo predictive genetic testing or carrier testing. The benefits and harms of testing 
frequently appear to be dependent on the individual’s life story and relationships 
prior to testing, and plans and level of support available after testing. 
Some have argued that consenting to genetic testing requires a higher degree of 
competence than consent to other kinds of medical procedures, because of the ethical, 
psychological and social issues. However, genetic testing raises the same issues in 
terms of legal competence to give informed consent, as other medical procedures: 
consent must be given voluntarily, on an informed basis, by a competent person. 
Genetic information may be more complex, and contain more uncertainties or 
probabilities than other medical information. However, this provides a challenge for 
health professionals to fulfil their obligations under the Code and give competent 
minors the requisite information in such a way that they can understand it and give 
legally effective informed consent. There is evidence that adequately educated and 
informed minors can understand the necessary genetic information to give informed 
consent to genetic testing.
The legal criteria for assessing competence remain the same in the context of genetic 
testing: the person must understand the purpose of the procedure, the nature of 
the procedure and the consequences and implications. Notably, professional position 
statements on genetic testing of minors do not appear to imply that there are different 
criteria for assessing competence for purposes of genetic testing. 
Larcher’s model for assessing competence, coupled with Binedell’s questions to 
consider when exploring whether minors understand the purpose, nature and 
consequences and implications of genetic testing, may provide appropriate tools 
with which genetic counsellors (and others) can assess the competence of minors to 
give legally effective informed consent in the clinical genetics setting. 





The medical decision-making framework in New Zealand is largely appropriate in 
its application to genetic testing and competent minors, and despite the ‘passionate 
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[paras 31-33]. ‘Age is not the final determinant; the fact that Tovia was under the age of sixteen does 
not prevent him from making an informed choice. That must be judged on his competence and his 
understanding of the situation.’ [para 48]. Surprisingly, no mention appears to have been made in 
counsels’ arguments, in summing up, or in the sentencing comments of any right of Tovia to refuse 
medical treatment pursuant to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (see M Woolford R	v	Laufau 
[2001] Journal	of	the	Auckland	Medico-Legal	Society	19). However, in summing up for the jury, Potter 
J makes no mention of the English cases of Re	R (a	Minor)	[1991] 4 All ER 177 or Re	W	(a	Minor)	
[1992] 3 WLR 758 or a higher standard of competence being required of minors under the age of 
sixteen to refuse medical treatment, implying (as Skegg has commented, at 193) that such minors 
might be able to give effective refusal to consent. And yet in sentencing, Potter J had this to say at 
para. 15: ‘The law recognises that young people are not necessarily capable of exercising the maturity 
necessary to take life and death decisions. Consequently, … the law imposes on their parents or their 
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caregivers the legal duty to provide the necessities of life so that their lives can be protected and not 
exposed to danger. It will not therefore usually be a lawful excuse for the parents to accede to the 
wishes of a child when it comes to a matter of life and death. The jury did not accept that Tovia’s 
wish that he not be returned to hospital, provided a lawful excuse that should have priority over the 
legal duty placed on Mr and Mrs Laufau to provide their son with the necessaries of life, namely 
medical treatment. The duty the law imposes on parents and caregivers is greater and stronger than 
the wishes of their children, no matter how sincerely and strongly they might be expressed, and 
no matter how strong may be the wish or will of the parents to accede to the child’s bidding. It is 
one matter for an adult person will full mental faculties to exercise a right to elect not to undergo 
medical treatment. It is quite a different matter for the parents or caregivers of a child who carry 
the legal duty and responsibility to ensure that child has the necessaries of life, to determine that the 
child shall not have medical treatment when medical treatment is necessary to protect his life. …’ 
The	Laufau case demonstrates that even if a child refuses treatment, and persuades his parents not 
to insist on treatment, the parents may still be held criminally liable. However, juries may doubt the 
competency of a child who dies as result of his medical decision (Jeannie Bayly ‘Informed Consent 
and Paediatricians’, accessed on 26 May 2006 from www.conferenz.co.nz/2004/library/b/bayly_
jeannie.html), and it seems clear that the jury and indeed the judge also doubted Tovia’s competency 
in this case (see discussion below on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990). 
49 Disagreements	between	Professionals	and	Families	about	Health-care	for	Children	and	Young	Persons, 
A discussion document prepared for the Paediatric Society of New Zealand and the Board of 
Paediatrics and Child Health of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians, August, 2001, available 
at www.paediatrics.org.nz/PSNZold/disputes_04.html, accessed 21June 2006. See discussion on the 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights, below this section. 
50 P.D.G. Skegg ‘Capacity to consent to treatment’, pp 171-203, 193 in P.D.G. Skegg and Ron Paterson 
Medical	Law	in	New	Zealand	Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2006. 
51 P.D.G. Skegg ‘Capacity to consent to treatment’, pp 171-203, 194 in P.D.G. Skegg and Ron Paterson 
Medical	Law	in	New	Zealand	Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2006. 
52 P.D.G. Skegg ‘Capacity to consent to treatment’, pp 171-203, 193 in P.D.G. Skegg and Ron Paterson 
Medical	Law	in	New	Zealand	Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2006. 
53 Section 15: Guardianship defined— For the purposes of this Act, ‘guardianship’ of a child means 
having (and therefore a ‘guardian’ of the child has), in relation to the child,— (a) all duties, powers, 
rights, and responsibilities that a parent of the child has in relation to the upbringing of the child: 
  (b) every duty, power, right, and responsibility that is vested in the guardian of a child by 
any enactment: (c) every duty, power, right, and responsibility that, immediately before the 
commencement, on 1 January 1970, of the Guardianship Act 1968, was vested in a sole guardian of a 
child by an enactment or rule of law. 
54 Mark Henaghan Family	Law	Outline,	‘Guardianship’, Faculty of Law, University of Otago, Dunedin, 
2006, p 11. 
55 Mark Henaghan Care	of	Children LexisNexis NZ Ltd, Wellington, 2005, p 20. Atkin lamented that 
the COCA 2004 did not make as much progress in terms of child rights as it could have, and that 
s 36 was limited by the ‘arbitrary age limit of 16’: ‘Noticeably absent is any attempt to adopt … 
Gillick. … This judgment was a major strike in favour of children’s rights and arguably it applies in 
New Zealand.’ Bill Atkin ‘The Care of Children Bill – Alright but only as far as it goes’, accessed 26 
May 2006 from www.conferenz.co.nz/2004/library/a/atkin_bill.htm. Shortly after the decision was 
handed down Atkin argued for the applicability of the general statements in Gillick to New Zealand. 
W R Atkin A	blow	for	the	rights	of	the	child, Mrs	Gillick	in	the	House	of	Lords, Family Law Bulletin, 35-
39 (1985). He contended that while the Act was a code it did not provide for every eventuality and 
the definition of ‘guardianship’ did not ‘purport to cover every circumstance.’ W.R. Atkin A	blow	for	
the	rights	of	the	child, Mrs	Gillick	in	the	House	of	Lords, p 36. Atkin further contended that while some 
may argue that s 14 (review of a guardian’s decision or refusal to give consent) implied that ‘children, 
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even in their late teens, have no independent decision making power and are subject to dominant 
parental power,’ the section did not set out at all when a parent or guardian’s consent was essential 
in law. Thus the importation of rules from Gillick was not inconsistent with the machinery provided 
to review a parent’s decision. The definition of ‘guardianship’ referred to a ‘right of control over the 
upbringing of a child,’ not to a right of ‘exclusive or complete control.’ It further did not address the 
relationship between parents and children: it did not rule out the possibility that as a matter of law 
children may have independent decision-making powers depending on their age and maturity. The 
definition deals more particularly with other contexts: a person who is not a guardian of a child not 
having rights over a child’s upbringing (Atkin, p 36). Atkin argues that ‘… guardianship includes 
all rights, powers and duties in respect of the person and upbringing of a child that were at the 
commencement of this Act vested by any enactment or rule of law in the sole guardian of a child.’ 
In other words, the common law is saved by an express provision of the kind envisaged by s 33. It is 
true that because of the word ‘includes’ guardians may have more rights, powers and responsibilities 
than were available at common law. But where the common law has clearly limited those rights, then 
that limitation prima facie should continue to exist. Gillick represents judicial lawmaking and is 
response to social and technological change. But in strict theory, Judges in formulating the common 
law are saying in clear words what was thitherto left unsaid. Thus it is submitted that Gillick 
articulates aspects of rights, duties and responsibilities of guardians (and parents) as they were ‘at 
the commencement of this Act. …The conclusion therefore is that the general level of statements in 
Gillick apply in New Zealand. They are consistent with the statutory scheme in the Guardianship Act 
1968” (Atkin, p 37). Given that the corresponding provision of the COCA 2004 (s 13 replaces 33 of 
the Guardianship Act 1968) is essentially the same, Atkin’s argument is equally useful today. Atkin 
then questioned whether the existence of s 25 of the GA 1968 (equivalent to s 36 of the COCA 2004) 
affected the application of Gillick. Section 25(5) expressly preserved any common law rules whereby 
(a) no consent or no express consent was necessary; (b) the consent of the child in addition to any 
other person is necessary; and (c) the consent of any other person instead of the consent of the child 
is sufficient (Atkin, p 37). ‘This subsection does not expressly refer to any rule whereby the consent 
of the child alone will be sufficient, but arguably a rule about the non-necessity of parental consent 
could fall within exception (a). Subsection 5(a) is silent on whose consent need not be obtained. It 
is possible to argue that in the context of a section which deals primarily with proxy consent, subs 
5(a) embraces, inter alia, the Gillick kind of situation. … no consent from the parents is necessary 
because the child can give sufficient consent. There is a further argument however to justify the 
co-existence of Gillick with s 25. Section 25(3), which sets out the authority for proxy consent, 
commences with the words “where the consent of any other person … is necessary or sufficient.” It 
will be noticed that the subsection does not spell out the circumstances in which another person’s 
consent is indeed necessary or sufficient. This is a matter left to the Courts and the determination 
of the House of Lords can been seen as filling the vacuum which has long existed on this question’ 
(Atkin, pp 37-38). Again, the relevant law remains essentially the same under the COCA 2004, and 
thus the argument retains its validity in the present day. 
56 Consent	in	Child	and	Youth	Health, Ministry of Health, Wellington, 1998, p 31 (available at: http://
www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/0/0E1E14F99334EBBACC256C150002EFEC.
57 P.D.G. Skegg ‘Capacity to consent to treatment’, pp 171-203, 193, in P.D.G. Skegg and Ron Paterson 
Medical	Law	in	New	Zealand	Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2006.
58 Ausage	v	Ausage [1997] NZFLR 72. In a case concerning an application by a sixteen-year-old girl for 
a final protection order against her father, Judge Somerville was ‘of the view that although a parent 
still has powers of correction of a sixteen-year-old child, that would involve the application of force 
on only the rarest of occasions.’ Judge Somerville adopted the following passage from the judgment 
of Lord Fraser in Gillick	v	West	Norfolk	AHA [1986] AC 112 at 171 in support of her view: ‘It is, in 
my view, contrary to the ordinary experience of mankind … to say that a child or young person 
remains in fact under the complete control of his parents until he attains the definite age of majority 
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… and that on attaining that age he suddenly acquires independence. In practice most wise parents 
relax their control gradually as the child develops and encourage him or her to become increasingly 
independent. Moreover, the degree of parental control actually exercised over a particular child does 
in practice vary considerably according to his understanding and intelligence and it would, in my 
opinion, be unrealistic for the Courts not to recognise these facts.’
59 Hyde	v	CIR [2000] NZFLR 385. In a case concerning an application by young person for payment of 
child support from her parents, Judge Carruthers stated that ‘In further support of his submission 
Mr Bourne refers amongst other cases to the well-known English authority of Gillick	v	West	Norfolk	
and	Wisbech	Area	Health	Authority [1986] AC 112 which established in very clear terms the capacity 
of a child or young person to make decisions for himself or herself.’
60 Ryding	v	Turvey [1998] NZFLR 313. In a Hague Convention case Judge Inglis QC stated that ‘I 
am satisfied on the psychologist’s evidence that Adam and Simon do indeed object to returning 
to England. The reasons for their respective objections are valid and well-founded both from 
the individual perspective of each and also objectively. I am satisfied that each has attained an 
age and level of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his views. … The views of 
Adam and Simon are not however determinative of the position and I have to take the next step of 
considering how far they should affect me. I have on this issue found helpful guidance in the classic 
case of	Gillick	v	West	Norfolk	and	Wisbech	Area	Health	Authority [1986] AC 112 (HL), which has 
nothing to do with the Hague Convention but everything to do with the rights of the child and the 
independence of a teenager. Lord Scarman (at 186) expressed the principle that “. . . parental right 
yields to the child’s right to make his own decisions when he reaches a sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to be capable of making up his own mind on the matter requiring decision.” Here both 
boys have expressed clear and consistent objections to returning to England and are shown to have 
been capable of making up their own minds on the matters which are basic to the objections which 
each has expressed.’
61 D-GSW	v	MJB	[1995] NZFLR 692 (High Court) and MJB	v	D-GSW [1996] NZFLR 337 (Court of 
Appeal). Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Gault, J stated that ‘The upbringing of 
children extends to making decisions for them as to health and medical treatment. That is a right 
long recognised under the common law in any event: Gillick	v	West	Norfolk	AHA [1986] 1 AC 112 
though, as that case makes clear, it was never absolute. As was pointed out particularly by Lord 
Scarman (184-5) the scope of parental rights is reflective of parental duties towards children.’
62 Re	B	(children) [1992] NZFLR 726. In a case concerning whether family reunification was in the 
best interests of children who had been placed in foster care, Judge Inglis QC stated: ‘It cannot be 
assumed that the return of a child to his or her family (in this case, on any view of the matter, to 
only part of the family) will automatically be in the child’s best interests and welfare simply because 
they are family. That gives the blood tie priority over the child’s welfare and interests. That is not 
permissible, because it makes the blood tie and parental and family rights, rather than the child’s 
welfare and interests, the deciding factor. Parental and family rights are relevant only to the extent 
that they are exercised for the welfare and interests of the child: Pallin	v	Department	of	Social	Welfare	
[1983] NZLR 266 (CA); Gillick	v	West	Norfolk	and	Wisbech	Area	Health	Authority	[1986] AC 112 
(HL); Director	General	of	Social	Welfare	v	L [1990] NZFLR 125, 137 (CA, per Hardie Boys J). While 
each of these cases was decided in a different statutory context, there is nothing in the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act to indicate a legislative intention to diminish the established 
legal principle laid down in them.’ In another case concerning a care and protection plan review 
(Re	the	P	Children	(No	2)	(1992) 9 FRNZ 93), Judge Inglis QC also referred approvingly to Lord 
Scarman’s statements about dwindling parental rights and children’s rights to make their own 
decisions when they reach sufficient understanding and intelligence. ‘Though the principle is clear 
and applies as a general principle in each case where the relationship of child and parent falls to be 
considered, each case must of course depend in the end on its own particular circumstances’ (p 107). 
On the facts before Judge Inlglis QC, relating to the educational deprivation of children who had 
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been brought up by ‘staunch Seven Day Adventists,’ ‘the parents’ right of control over the two eldest 
boys’ lives is a dwindling right and those boys are entitled to a voice in their future’ (p 108). 
63 R	v	Hemi [1986] 2 NZLR 116. In deciding to admit evidence from a detective about a fifteen-year-
old’s confession of murder, Jeffries, J stated that ‘Defence counsel concentrated on the chronological 
age of the accused and that undoubtedly, as I have said, is an important indicator. However, in 
my view the Court is obliged to make that only one aspect, although an important one, in the 
environment in which we are now living. As the age of majority has fallen with earlier maturing 
physically and mentally of young people, so assessments of maturity at lower ages has to be 
reconsidered. At 15 a person may join the workforce. Gillick’s case [1985] 3 All E.R 402 in the House 
of Lords has faced the changing environment. A Court is required in circumstances such as these to 
assess, as best it is able, the level of maturity of this accused.’ 
64 Director-General	of	Social	Welfare	v	R	(1997) 16 FRNZ 357. At p 368 Judge P von Dadelszen said 
‘Everyone who gave evidence only confirmed my view that R’s current level of maturity is such 
that her own wishes must be given a considerable amount of weight. The leading authority on the 
issue of the child’s wishes is that of the House of Lords in Gillick	… where Lord Scarman said that 
parental rights yield “to the child’s right to make his own decisions when he reaches a sufficient 
understanding and intelligence to be capable or making up his own mind on the matter requiring 
decision”.’ Judge P von Dadelszen concluded that ‘there should be no order, the effect of which will 
compel R to see her mother against her wishes. Such a view acknowledges this young person’s right 
to control this aspect of her life and it is plainly in her best interests. I think it entirely inappropriate 
that this Court should be seen to be foisting something on her against her will. That would send 
quite the wrong message to this mature almost 15-year-old girl: that, not only is she not listened to, 
or, even if she is, her wishes are not respected’ (at p 371). 
65 R	v	Laufau	and	Laufau	23/8/00 Potter J HC Auckland T000759. See note 48 for a discussion of the 
application of Gillick	in this case.
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